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CONSUMER CREDIT RATES IN THE EUROZONE:
EVIDENCE ON THE E MERGENCE
OF A SINGLE RETAIL BANKING MARKET
STEFANIE KLEIMEIER AND HARALD SANDER
E XECUTIVE SUMMARY
his study provides new evidence on the emergence of a single eurozone retail
banking market with particular reference to consumer credit. Given the
heterogeneous nature of consumer credit products in the eurozone, the authors
reject the earlier proposition of the  Cecchini study, which equates banking market
integration with identical interest rates throughout the eurozone. The present study
advocates the use of the co-integration methodology, which allows us to investigate
integration in the presence of country-specific credit rates. The empirical results indicate
only very limited evidence of an integrated retail banking market prior to 1 January
1999, pointing to the limited effectiveness of the single market cum Second Banking
Directive in particular in integrating consumer credit markets.
The relationship of national lending markets with the remaining eurozone lending
markets, however, exhibits strong signs of structural changes that have come along with
the introduction of the single currency. Regarding this period under monetary union, the
results provide a first picture of an emerging uniform eurozone banking market. This
tendency is more pronounced for the corporate lending market, while consumer lending
markets are still more fragmented. The study identifies three possible driving forces of
this integration process: cross-border borrowing and lending (arbitrage), a competitive
national and international retail banking environment, and a smooth and uniform pass-
through of interest rate changes onto lending rates. While the extent of cross-border
retail banking is still very limited and interest rate pass-through is working most
efficiently and uniformly in the more competitive corporate lending market, the authors
conclude that the single currency has the potential to “complete” the single market in a
very special sense. It is not so much cross-border arbitrage that has so far produced the
“statistical signs” of an uniform retail banking market, but a smooth and uniform pass-
through of interest rate changes induced by the single monetary policy. The lack of
evidence of integration in consumer credit so far therefore also points to the relevance
of competition policy for creating a uniform consumer credit market in the eurozone.
T1
C HAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
n 1988, the Commission of the European Communities commissioned a study, now
widely known as the Cecchini report (European Commission, 1988), which derived
quantitative estimates of the benefits of financial market integration. The study
predicted that post-integration prices will fall to a level equal to the prices of the country
with the lowest pre-integration prices. In order to realise these predicted benefits, the
Second Banking Directive (2
nd BD) was implemented on 1 January 1993, for the member
countries of the European Union with the intent to provide an appropriate regulatory
environment for the single European banking market. As Kleimeier and Sander (2000)
have shown, however, the degree of integration in the retail banking market before the
introduction of the single currency on 1 January 1999 was limited. This situation raises the
question of the extent to which the single currency will contribute to the creation of a
single consumer credit market. For example, Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa (2000) from the
ECB board argues that the “multiplicity of currencies in the single market was a
fundamental factor behind the preservation of the segmentation of the banking industry”
and that “it is indeed the existence of a single currency and a single central bank which
very often unifies a banking system”. Nonetheless, while most observers find at least some
evidence for the emergence of a single banking industry in the area of wholesale banking
and capital market activities, they remain more sceptical in the area of retail banking and,
in particular with respect to consumer credit (Padoa-Schioppa, 2000 and Diez  Guardia,
2000).
The aim of our study is to provide further evidence on the emergence of a single
eurozone retail banking market with particular reference to consumer credit. To do so,
we develop a methodology that allows us to shed light on the following questions in the
debate on convergence of consumer credit rates in the eurozone:
§  How effective have the single-market cum Second Banking Directive undertaking
been so far in integrating consumer credit markets?
§  Are nominal and real costs of borrowing converging across Europe?
§  Is there evidence of differential effects in various consumer credit products?
§  How effective is the transmission of interest rate changes by monetary policy into
lending rates and are there differences in the “pass-through” among the countries of
the eurozone and among the various lending rates?
§  What has been the contribution of the single currency so far and what is its likely
future impact on this process?
Any attempt to answer these questions today is highly ambitious for the very simple reason
that the data available are very limited. And to draw conclusions either from past data after
almost revolutionary changes have taken place in the European monetary system, or from
a two-year experience with a single currency and all the transition processes underway is
risky, to say the least. We therefore fully bear in mind the limitations of the analysis
resulting from the limitations of the database. Nonetheless, we hope to develop an
approach that allows us to answer these research questions in principle – and in particular
and with increasing confidence when the integration process further unfolds.
I2
CHAPTER II
TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED EUROPEAN RETAIL BANKING MARKET?
1. Recent developments in European banking
Bank lending plays a dominant role in providing funds to the corporate, private and
public sector in Europe. Based on data for 1999 provided by the European Central Bank
(2000a), bank loans in the eurozone amounted to 100.4% of the gross domestic product
which is clearly higher than, for example, the corresponding figure (48.4%) in the
United States. In contrast, market-based forms of funding, which are an alternative for
corporations, are used to a lesser extent in the eurozone. Outstanding domestic debt
securities amount to 88.8% in the eurozone, compared to 164.6% in the US, and stock
market capitalisation amounts to 71.1% in the eurozone, compared to 163.3% in the US.
The banking market in the EU has been shaped to a large extent by the regulatory
process aiming at liberalisation and integration. At the beginning of the 1980s, the
banking markets of Italy, France and Belgium could be considered to be highly
regulated, whereas banking markets in Germany, the United Kingdom and the
Netherlands were only slightly regulated (De  Bondt, 1998). For example, capital
controls were in place in many highly regulated countries. Furthermore, interest rate
regulations were in place as late as 1992 or 1993 in some EU member countries (Diez
Guardia, 2000). Specifically, interest rates were deregulated early in the UK (1979),
Germany (1981) and the Netherlands (1981) compared to Denmark (1988); Belgium,
France, Italy, and Luxembourg (all 1990); Spain and Portugal (both 1992) and Ireland
and Greece (both 1993). Even if the establishment of the common market has been an
objective in the EU since the 1957 Treaty of Rome and has been reinforced by the 1985
White Paper and the 1986 Single European Act, very little had been achieved for the
banking markets until the 2
nd BD of 1989. Regarding key regulatory elements, the First
Banking Directive (1
st BD) of 1977, which allowed for cross-border branching under the
host-country rule,
1 was not very effective in reducing differences between national
regulatory systems and was thus followed by a 2
nd  BD. The latter relied on three
fundamental principles: harmonisation, mutual recognition and home country control
and supervision
2 – the latter representing a complete turnaround in regulatory policy
compared to the 1
st BD.
Since 1986, additional directives which are aimed at further harmonisation of the
different national EU banking markets have been passed concerning bank supervision,
capital adequacy, solvency standards, money laundering, consumer credit or publishing
and consolidation of annual accounts to name but a few.
3 In the area of consumer credit,
                                                                
1 Under the host-country rule, a bank had to obtain permission to operate in a foreign country by the
supervisory agencies of that country.
2 Harmonisation should lead to a system where banks operating in several countries face a common set of
EU regulations. Mutual recognition implies that the banking charter of the home country is sufficient to
operate in all EU countries. Home-country rule, finally, stipulates that foreign-owned banks are regulated
by their home country and not by the host country.
3 For details see Kleimeier (2001), Sander and Kleimeier (2000), Diez  Guardia (2000) and Zimmerman
(1995).CONSUMER CREDIT RATES IN THE EUROZONE
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in 1986 the European Community introduced a consumer credit directive. The main two
objectives of this directive were consumer protection and facilitation of cross-border
credit by means of harmonisation of the banks’ information provision to its customers.
This directive was amended and completed by two more consumer credit directives in
1990 and 1998, respectively.
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On 1 January 1999, the  euro replaced the national currencies of Austria, Belgium,
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and
Spain. Of the remaining EU countries, Greece initially failed to meet the required
economic criteria but joined EMU on 1 January 2001, whereas Denmark, Sweden and
the United Kingdom have elected not to join the EMU as yet.
Assessing the eurozone banking markets from a purely legal perspective, integration can
be considered as far advanced (Zimmerman, 1995 and Bredemeier, 1995). However,
non-regulatory barriers to integration, such as cultural differences in consumer
behaviour and preferences for certain types of credit, continue to exist. Thus according
to the ECB, whereas eurozone interbank and wholesale markets are considered to be
integrated, the extent of integration in the retail banking markets appears to be limited.
For one thing, r etail lending products are less exposed to international competitive
pressure since proximity to customers is important even when one accounts for advances
in modern distribution technology. On the other hand, this impression is re-enforced when
looking at the limited extent of cross-border lending. The focus in bank lending and
deposit-taking is clearly domestic. In 1999, 79.8% of all loans and 72.8% of loans to the
non-bank private sector were domestic. Similarly, 72.8% of all deposits and 86.5% of
deposits to the non-bank private sector were domestic. Moreover, 66.7% of all
government securities and 39.5% of all non-bank private securities are domestic. Only
for this last business activity is the foreign business dominant and euro-area holdings
amount to 19.1%.
Nevertheless, the growth rates for all eurozone activities – with the exception of
deposits from the non-bank private sector – are positive and larger than the
corresponding growth rates for domestic activities. Furthermore, the market shares of
foreign banks in Europe were still very low in most countries in 1997. In Denmark,
France, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Portugal and Spain, foreign banks have
a market share of less than 12%. In Belgium and Ireland, their market shares lie in the
mid-range with 36.3% and 53.6%, respectively. Only in Luxembourg do foreign banks
dominate the market with a share of 99.9% (ECB, 1999a, 1999b, 2000a and 2000b).
Similar figures have been reported by Diez Guardia (2000).
One reason for these localised retail banking markets where banks are neither reaching
out for all prospective eurozone customers, nor are consumers shopping around for
credits in the whole eurozone is given by Padoa-Schioppa (2000). He refers to a survey
conducted by the US Federal Reserve Bank that found that 90% of a bank’s clientele in
the United States is located on average within a distance of less than 20 miles of the
bank's premises. He concludes that “proximity is an intrinsic characteristic of the retail
market with or without the emergence of a currency embracing a wider area”. One
                                                                
4 For details and evaluation, see Diez Guardia (2000).KLEIMEIER & SANDER
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should read such results with caution, however, as the localisation of retail banking in
the US is also, and in particular, the result of US banking regulation.
5
Another reason for the low incidence of cross-border lending could lie in the
organisational strategies adopted by European banks with respect to the type of bank
they want to become in an integrated European banking market. In principle, a bank can
either become a Europe-wide universal bank, a domestic universal bank, a Europe-wide
specialised bank or a domestic specialised bank. According to  Marois (1997), the
strategies adopted by European banks are diverse and a dominant strategy has yet to
emerge. The deregulatory process in the EU has however sparked two phases of bank
mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in Europe. The first phase took place in the late
1980s and early 1990s as a reaction to the 2
nd BD and the second phase took place in the
second half of the 1990s in anticipation of EMU (Tourani Rad and van Beek, 1999). As
Padoa-Schioppa (2000) argues, it is an error to believe that “a single banking industry
will only emerge when cross-border mergers occur”. Nevertheless, the pattern of M&As
can give us an indication about the types of banks operating in the European market.
Table 1. Value of M&As in the financial sector between 1985 and 1997
Acquirer
Commercial bank Securities firm Insurance company
Target Value % of
total
Value % of
total
Value % of
total
Panel A. Domestic M&As
Commercial bank 89.0 36.0 23.0 9.3 11.0 4.4
Securities firm 9.0 3.6 19.0 7.7 6.0 2.4
Insurance company 20.0 8.1 24.0 9.7 46.0 18.6
Panel B. Intra-European M&As
Commercial bank 15.0 17.9 4.3 5.1 11.2 13.4
Securities firm 8.7 10.4 5.8 6.9 0.3 0.4
Insurance company 0.4 0.5 1.1 1.3 37.0 44.2
Panel C. Europe-Non-Europe M&As
Commercial bank 14.5 14.5 15.6 15.6 1.0 1.0
Securities firm 4.3 4.3 15.9 15.9 3.1 3.1
Insurance company 0.3 0.3 12.9 12.9 32.7 32.7
Note: Values are given in billions of $. For each panel, the percent figures total 100.
Source: Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999).
Note in Table 1 that the total value of domestic M&As, which is mainly driven by
acquisitions of commercial banks and securities firms, exceeds that of cross-border
M&As. Only for insurance companies does the value of cross-border M&As exceed the
value of domestic M&As. This implies that consolidation is still taking place on a
national rather than international level. Furthermore, for commercial banks and
securities firms,  M&As within Europe are as important as other foreign  M&As,
                                                                
5 The McFadden Act, which was in place from 1927 until 1994, explicitly prohibited interstate branching.
In 1994, the basis for a truly US-wide banking system was laid with the adoption of the Riegel-Neal
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act.CONSUMER CREDIT RATES IN THE EUROZONE
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indicating a global rather than regional consolidation process. Consolidation within the
sector is also more common than consolidation across sectors with domestic M&As and
to a lesser extent Europe-non-Europe M&As, with the only exception being when the
acquirer is a securities firm. This would indicate that most banks in Europe are still
specialised rather than being universal banks. Taken together these findings show that
the typical EU bank can still be characterised as a specialised domestic bank. Therefore,
the result presented earlier that most bank activities are still domestic in nature is not
surprising (Kleimeier, 2001).
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2. What constitutes an integrated banking market?
2.1 The non-applicability of the “law of one price” in credit markets
Quantifying the degree of integration of the retail banking market is not an easy task.
The Cecchini study advances the hypothesis of price equalisation for financial assets
within Europe as the characteristic of completely integrated markets. This “law of one
price” manifests itself in financial markets as the “interest rate parity”. It is well
established that under perfect capital mobility the covered interest parity typically holds,
but it is more difficult to establish the empirical validity of the uncovered interest parity
(UIP) due to exchange rate volatility or exchange rate expectations.
In the context of retail banking, the case for the law of one price is, however, not so
straightforward. First, the interest rate parity is suggested as parity for interest rates on
assets such as government bonds, which are close if not perfect substitutes. This is
clearly not the case for bank assets such as consumer credits. Rather, credits are
characterised by heterogeneity caused by risk differences, cultural influences in bank-
client relationship, country-specific strategic bank behaviour in order to cope with
informational imperfections (moral hazard, incentive effects, etc.), to name just a few.
Consequently, one cannot expect the law of one price to hold in the strict sense in the
consumer credit market. Secondly, there is clearly not (yet) a perfect “capital” mobility.
As discussed in the previous section, banks are neither reaching out to all prospective
eurozone customers, nor are consumers shopping around for credits in the whole
eurozone, i.e. retail banking is still localised. Thus, retail interest rates may not as easily
equalise as suggested by the Cecchini study. Rather, even when they are equalising but
the underlying characteristics of credits are different, this may not even be a sign of an
integrated banking market. Looking simply at interest rate convergence or equalisation
can therefore be profoundly misleading.
2.2 Interest rate trends in the eurozone – Some descriptive statistics
Despite the reservation we have about the use of descriptive statistics, we report them in
Table A1 in the Annex and illustrate the (non-) convergence process in Figures 1 to 3
below. The data source is the ECB's National Retail Interest Rates Statistics. We report
the following interest rates: mortgage loans to households (N2), consumer loans to
                                                                
6 It is interesting to note that the only strategy that can be characterised as clearly European is the
acquisition strategy that insurance company follow within Europe when acquiring banks. This strategy
accounts for 13.4% of all intra-European M&As and is the only M&A type for which the intra-European
percentage is higher than either the domestic or the non-European share. Thus, it appears that a European
trend towards ALLFINANZ might be emerging.KLEIMEIER & SANDER
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households (N3), and to compare the developments for households with those for the
corporate sector we also report the lending rate charged to the corporate sector (N4).
These rates are available on a monthly basis starting in the 1980s with most countries
reporting regularly as of 1989. We will, however, concentrate on the period from April
1995 to December 2000, since data for all countries are available for this time on a
regular base (a more detailed description of the data is provided in Box 1). We also
distinguish a pre-euro period characterised by the process of implementing the single
market up to the end of 1998 and a second period that is characterised by the
introduction of the single currency after 1 January 1999.
Figures 1 and 2 show the convergence of interest rates for mortgage rates, consumer
lending rates and corporate lending rates in both nominal and real terms. Clearly all
nominal rates are now closer together then they were in the mid-1990s, but this can
largely be attributed to the effect of macroeconomic factors, in particular the single
monetary policy. It is also clear that mortgage rates are closer together because the
credit characteristics across countries are more similar throughout the eurozone as
compared to the lending rates charged for the other credit forms that differ more widely
in their characteristics (as well as in their statistical definition). For example, while Italy
had the highest average mortgage rate of 11.1% in the pre-EMU phase and Belgium
with 6.1% the lowest rate, both countries have the almost identical average rate of about
6% in the EMU phase. As argued before, however, interest rates need not be equalised –
and in most cases should not be equalised, even in the presence of an integrated banking
market.
From the “localised” consumer's point of view, however, the real, consumer price
inflation-corrected cost of mortgage borrowing still differs widely throughout the
eurozone, with the highest real cost in France (5.2%) and the lowest in Ireland (1.4%),
mainly because of differences in consumer price inflation. As far as consumer and
corporate lending rates are concerned, also here the cross-country differences have
become smaller, but they still remain large, in particular for consumer lending rates.
In Figure 3 we show the development of the spread between retail lending rates and the
money market rate (as a proxy of the banks’ cost of funding), which could be
interpreted as a rough proxy for credit market imperfections. A recent study by
Corvoisier and  Gropp (2001) has shown that despite the pro-competitive move in
European banking through deregulation, the increased concentration stemming from the
recent wave of bank mergers may have resulted in less competitive loan pricing by
banks. Our figure is consistent with this assessment and additionally shows that spreads
differ significantly across countries but also across lending markets with spreads for
consumer lending typically being the highest. Moreover, as far as convergence patterns
are concerned, the only clear effect can be found in the mortgage market.CONSUMER CREDIT RATES IN THE EUROZONE
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Figure 1. Nominal interest rates
Panel A. Mortgage lending rates
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Panel C. Corporate lending rates
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Figure 2. Real interest rates
Panel A. Mortgage lending rates
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Panel C. Corporate lending rates
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Figure 3. Interest rate spreads
Panel A. Mortgage lending rates
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Panel C. Corporate lending rates
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Box 1. Data sources and data construction
Our study mainly relies on monthly national retail interest rates that have been obtained from
the European Central Bank. The ECB collects three consumer lending rates: overdrafts on cash
accounts (series N1), mortgage loans to households (series N2) and consumer loans to
households (series N3). As the series N1 is only available for France and Ireland, we are forced
to focus on the remaining series N2 and N3. In addition, we report results for corporate lending
rates based on the series N4 short-term loans to enterprises. These series are available for the
EMU member countries of Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Greece has not been included in our study as it did not join
EMU until January 2001. Note, however, that for Finland no data are available for N4. For
France, N2 and N3 are only available as quarterly data. When analysing French lending rates,
we assume that interest rates are constant during the given quarter and thus convert the quarterly
to a monthly frequency by filling in the missing values. For Belgium, Italy and Portugal several
different N4 series are available and the series 4.1, 4.1 and 4.2 have been chosen, respectively,
as the relevant corporate lending rate. Finally, whereas some national series start as early as
1980, data for all EMU member countries are available only as of April 1995. Thus we decided
to focus on the period from April 1995 until December 2000. For details on data, see the ECB’s
National Retail Interest Rates – Methodological Notes.
Based on these nominal interest rate series, real interest rates are calculated by deducting
inflation rates. Inflation rates are calculated as the percentage change in the consumer price
index (CPI) which is obtained from the CD-ROM version of the IMF’s International Financial
Statistics (IFS). From January 1996 until December 2000, a harmonised consumer price index
(HCPI) as given in the IFS’s line 64H is available for all EU countries and has been used.
Before January 1996, the national CPI of line 64 is used. Exceptions to this rule are the
following: For Portugal, national CPI data are used until December 1998 and HCPI is used
starting January 1999. For Ireland, no CPI data are available. Thus, inflation rates are calculated
based on wholesale prices until December 1998, and HCPI is used starting January 1999.
In order to calculate European weighted averages for the nominal and real interest rate series
N2, N3 and N4, weights for each country have to be found. These weights should appropriately
reflect the relative economic importance of the eurozone countries. We therefore work with the
OECD (2000) weighting scheme for aggregate measures, which is based on 1995 GDP and
purchasing power parities. The weights are 0.82 for Austria, 1.05 for Belgium, 0.46 for Finland,
5.72 for France, 8.33 for Germany, 0.31 for Ireland, 5.49 for Italy, 1.57 for the Netherlands,
0.65 for Portugal and 2.84 for Spain. Note that when estimating equation (1.3), the country
under investigation is excluded from the European average and the weights are re-scaled to sum
up to 100%.
Finally, money market rates are obtained from line 60b of the CD-ROM version of the IMF’s
IFS. National rates are used until December 1998, but due to the convergence of money market
rates under the single currency, euro area rates have been used as of January 1999.
2.3  Co-integrated retail banking markets
Because of the different characteristics of the various (still) national credit instruments
(as well as the differences in the reported statistics), we propose to base the judgement
about the existence of a uniform eurozone retail banking system on the existence of “co-
integration” among national credit markets in Europe. This concept realises that
although full equalisation cannot be expected, the concept of market integration requiresCONSUMER CREDIT RATES IN THE EUROZONE
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that interest rates should exhibit a certain long-run equilibrium relationship. Thus, we do
not require that the national interest rate of a country (Lnat) should equal the interest rate
in the remaining eurozone (LEU) as it would be required by the “law of one price”
shown in equation (1):
(1)  L nat = LEU
Rather, we accept as a possible long-run relationship that the rates may differ from each
other such that:
(2)  Lnat =  a + b LEU
In the long-run, equation (2) can be interpreted as a relationship reflecting the existence
of a financial system with “structural trends and systematic disturbances in banking
[that] cut across state borders”,
7 while deviations from the long-run equilibrium
relationship are possible in the short-run. This equation could in principle be estimated
by means of regression analysis. However, since interest rates typically follow a so-
called “random-walk”, also known as an “integrated time series”, one may obtain
spurious results from regression analysis. To establish that there exists a certain long-
term relationship one therefore has to undertake a so-called co-integration analysis (for
details, see Box 2). If co-integration is found, this reflects that national interest rates are
connected in terms of a long-term relationship as shown in equation (2). This retail
interest rate link must, however, not necessarily reflect banking market integration in
the sense suggested by Cecchini. Rather, in the short-run, deviations from this long-run
equilibrium can be corrected over time by one or more of the following three
mechanisms:
•  An international arbitrage (cross-border lending) process where banks increasingly
shift their lending activities to countries where lending rates are the highest while
consumers borrow in low-interest countries.
•  When money market rates equalise by means of an international arbitrage process,
such changes will have an impact on lending rates via domestic competition that ties
lending and borrowing rates together (interest rate pass-through).
•  Increased (international) competition, or the threat of it as suggested by the theory of
contestable markets will help to harmonise the pricing behaviour of banks and thus
lead to a harmonisation of retail prices.
In the remainder of the study, we will investigate the presence or absence of such a
long-term relationship among eurozone retail banking markets and enquire into the
mechanisms that eventually bind national interest rates together.
                                                                
7 For this sentence we have used the words of Padoa-Schioppa (2000) which he used to refer to the
localised US financial system, which is widely viewed as integrated.KLEIMEIER & SANDER
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Box 2. Co-integration methodology
To establish that there exists a certain long-term relationship between national interest rates and
the weighted average of the remaining eurozone countries, such as the one indicated in equation
2 in the main text, we have to undertake co-integration testing. Following  Engle and Granger
(1987), a setting where time series of individual variables “can wander extensively and yet some
pairs of series may be expected to move so they do not drift too far apart” is best being studied
in the context of a co-integration analysis. The reason for the need of using this methodology is
that simple regression analyses of equations like (2) may lead to spurious results when time
series such as interest rates follow a so-called random walk. The underlying idea of co-
integration is that such non-stationary time series, however, can move apart in the short-run, but
will be brought back by market forces to an equilibrium relation in the long run. The co-
integration methodology applied in this study follows closely the approach promoted by Engle
and Granger (1987) and proceeds in three steps. First the time series must be proven to be unit
roots. Only then can the co-integration vector be estimated. Finally, once co-integration has
been established, the corresponding error correction model will be estimated.
In order to establish whether the interest rates are unit roots, or I(1), two test statistics, a t-
statistic and an F-statistic, will be employed based on regressions on levels as well as first
differences of the underlying series. Both include next to lagged observations of the lending rate
L in question also a trend variable T:
(2.1) DLt = h0 + h1 Lt-1 + h2 DLt-1 + h3 T + et 
(2.2) D2Lt = h0 + h1 DLt-1 + h2 D2Lt-1 + h3 T + et
The null hypothesis states that the series follow random walks. For the t-statistic, this
corresponds to a null hypothesis of H0: h1 = 0 and for the F-statistic to a null hypothesis of H0:
h1 = h3 = 0. We fail to reject the null hypothesis of a random walk if the calculated t or F values
are smaller in absolute terms than the critical values. Thus, as a precondition for co-integration,
we have to accept the null hypotheses for equation (2.1.) but reject them for equation (2.2).
Once the I(1) characteristic has been established, co-integration testing can commence starting
with estimating the co-integration regression using the national lending rate L nat for the
individual country as the dependent variable and the weighted average rate for the remaining
EU countries LEU as the independent variable:
(2.3) L nat,t = a + b LEU,t + ut
A first co-integration testing procedure relies on the Durbin-Watson statistics (DW). The null
hypothesis of no co-integration can be rejected when the calculated DW values resulting from
the regression of equation (2.3) are larger than the critical values. As Engle and Granger point
out, the Durbin-Watson test can be used as a good but only approximate indicator for co-
integration and should be followed by a more specific testing procedure such as the Dickey-
Fuller (DF) and augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests. The Dickey-Fuller test is based on the
residuals of the co-integration regression
(2.4) Dût = -d0 ût-1 + et
where the t-statistic for the estimated coefficient -d0 provides an indication regarding the co-
integration of the two series. In particular, the null hypothesis of no co-integration can be
rejected when the t-statistic is larger in absolute value than the critical value.CONSUMER CREDIT RATES IN THE EUROZONE
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The augmented Dickey-Fuller test is obtained in a two-step procedure from the regression
(2.5) Dût = -d0 ût-1 + ￿
=
4
1 i
di Dût-i + et
In the first step, equation (2.5) is estimated including all 4 lags of Dût-i. In the second step,
equation (2.5) is re-estimated including only the significant lags of Dût-i from step 1. Now, the
null hypothesis of no co-integration can be rejected when the t-statistic for the estimated
coefficient -d0 is larger in absolute value than the critical value.
Once the existence of a long-run relationship, i.e. co-integration is established, one can
investigate the short-run dynamics of interest rates by estimating the corresponding error
correction model (ECM). This model will provide an estimate of the speed of adjustment with
which the system returns back to the long-run equilibrium. To find the correct specification of
the ECM, first, an unrestricted vector  autoregression (UVAR) is estimated based on the
regression
(2.6) DLnat,t= l0 + l1 Lnat,t-1 + l2 LEU,t-1 + ￿
=
4
1 i
lnati DLnat,t-i + ￿
=
4
1 i
lEUi DLEU,t-i +
et
From this regression, the significant lagged first differences of the exogenous and endogenous
variables are identified and included in the final ECM in combination with any error correction
terms ECT obtained from the estimated errors that were found significant in the co-integration
(2.7) DLnat,t = j0 + j1 ût-1 + ￿
=
4
1 i
jnati DLnat,t-i + ￿
=
4
1 i
jEUi DLEU,t-i + et
The estimated coefficient j1 of the ECT measures the speed of adjustment. For example an
estimated j1 of -0.2 indicates that if there is a shock to the national lending rate Lnat,t, which
raises its value relative to the equilibrium relationship to the co-integrated EU-wide lending rate
LEU,t, then one-fifth of the divergence is eliminated in the following period.14
CHAPTER III
IS A UNIFIED EUROPEAN RETAIL BANKING MARKET EMERGING?
NO, NO AND MAYBE!
n this chapter, we base our judgement of whether a uniform European banking
system is actually emerging on the result of the proposed co-integration analysis that
we performed for all retail lending rates for all eurozone countries in both nominal
and real terms.
8 While we are confident that the methodology we propose is helpful in
monitoring the progress towards an integrated European banking market, the existing
database is still the major obstacle for making strict judgements at the present time. Its
limitations are three-fold. First, there is no sufficiently harmonised data on consumer
credit (Diez  Guardia, 2000). This problem can and should be addressed in the future,
but in the meantime the data provided by the ECB can be used as a first proxy.
Secondly, the time period for which data for all countries are available simultaneously is
very limited. And third, the introduction of the single currency has brought about
structural changes that limit the available database further. In particular, we find that the
introduction of the single currency in 1999 has sufficiently shaken up the structural
relationship to allow for judgements on the current state of integration based on data
relating to the EMU phase. This limits the database from which to derive judgements to
a 2-year period, which limits the power of the statistical work. But there is basically
nothing that can be done about it, except to include past data that may not reflect the
current state of integration. Given the data limitations, the results of the study will have
to be interpreted with caution, but are, nevertheless, in our view still very valuable.
Figures 4 and 5 visualise the results of the structural break test that we have conducted
for the co-integration relationship for both nominal and real lending rates (for details on
the methodology, see Box 3). Typically the peaks in the figures represent the
presence/timing of the structural break, provided that the F-statistics value exceeds a
certain critical value (such as 15). See e.g. Germany in early 1999 in nominal
mortgages. The first striking result is that for nominal interest rates almost all long-run
relationships show evidence in favour of a structural break around late 1998 – that is,
around the date of the introduction of the single currency. This is particularly true for
mortgage and corporate lending rates, whereas structural breaks for consumer lending
rates appear to occur on average about a year earlier, which supports the view that a
single currency will have a major impact on the unification of a banking system. For
real interest rates, we generally find structural breaks predominately occur between
1996 and early 1998, with the notable exception of Austrian and Dutch mortgage and
corporate lending rates. This may be interpreted as the result of the convergence process
in terms of inflation rates that occurred in the mid-1990s.
9
                                                                
8 As explained in Box 2, co-integration analysis requires that the time series are random walks – that is,
that they are integrated of the order 1. As shown in Table A2 in the Annex, this pre-condition is generally
fulfilled. For nominal and real lending rates, there is evidence for I(0) or I(2) for only 10% of the series.
9 To illustrate this point, let us consider fully integrated real interest rates with the real interest rates in
two countries both being 5% (and varying thereafter driven by the same structural trends). With an
expected inflation rate of 2% in both countries, the nominal rate would be 7%. Now consider one country
starting from an inflation rate expectation of 6%, which would imply a nominal interest rate of 11%. If
inflation and subsequently inflation expectations would converge to 2%, the nominal interest rate in the
high-inflation country would decrease and, consequently, nominal interest rates would not be co-
integrated during the inflation convergence process.
IFigure 4. Rolling Chow Tests for Cointegration of Nominal Interest Rates
Panel A. Mortgage lending rates
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Panel A, cont. Mortgage lending rates
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Panel B. Consumer lending rates
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Panel C. Corporate lending rates
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Panel A. Mortgage lending rates
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Panel A, cont. Mortgage lending rates
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Panel B. Consumer lending rates
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Panel C. Corporate lending rates
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Box 3. Testing for structural breaks
In the presence of important changes in the economic structure, such as the implementation of
the 2nd Banking Directive or the adoption of a single currency, the long-run relationship
between the interest rates in the eurozone could be affected, i.e. both parameters of the co-
integrating regression may change in a statistically significant way. In order to test for such
structural breaks in the co-integration relationship, we conduct a rolling Chow test which
implies the following procedure: First, the co-integration regression as described in Box 2 using
the national lending rate L nat for the individual country as the dependent variable and the
weighted average rate for the remaining EU countries LEU as the independent variable
(3.1) L nat,t = a + b LEU,t + ut
is estimated for the full sample ranging from April 1995 to December 2000. In the presence of a
structural break, however, the DW, DF, and ADF co-integration tests have low power, i.e. the
rejection frequency of the ADF test is clearly reduced (e.g. Gregory et al., 1996). Thus, in a
second step, the co-integration vector is tested for structural breaks such that H0: at1 = at2 and
bt1 = bt2 with sub-samples t1 = 1 to k and t2 = k+1 to T. If k, the time of the break is known,
the two samples t1 and t2 are clearly identified and a standard Chow test can be conducted. In
our case, we consider a break to be likely around January 1999, but the exact timing of the break
– if indeed there is one – is not known. Thus, rather than using a standard Chow test, a
supremum F (supF) test is calculated. This test was first proposed by  Quandt (1960) and has
recently been the focus of various studies (e.g. Andrews, 1993,  Diebold and Chen, 1996 and
Hansen, 1992). In our single equation model, the supF test can be found by conducting a series
of Chow tests. In particular, Chow tests are conducted for a series of different break points k,
which move through the mid-80% of the sample. SupF equals the largest Chow F-statistic and is
compared to critical values as reported by Hansen (1992). Depending on the model, the number
of observations, etc., any estimated supF test statistic larger than approximately 15 will allow us
to reject the null hypothesis of no structural break. Furthermore, the sequence of F-statistics can
give an indication about the timing of the break.
In sum, we therefore are confident to continue the analysis with an EMU sub-period that
is free of structural breaks. This is not always true for the pre-EMU period, but for the
sake of comparability we have chosen the 1995-98 period. Since we are interested in the
issue of the emergence of an integrated banking system, however, we particularly
concentrate on the EMU period.
Based on our structural break tests, we conduct a co-integration analysis for the full
period from and for both sub-periods, April 1985 to December 1998 and January 1999
to December 2000, respectively. If such a long-term relationship can be established, we
speak of an co-integrated market. The degree of co-integration can then – and only then
– be investigated within the “corresponding error-correction model” (ECM). This ECM
allows us to estimate how fast the national interest rates are driven back to their long-
run equilibrium relationship that they have with the remaining average European
countries. The existence and the re-approach towards such a long-term relationship after
a disturbance are interpreted as evidence for the existence of a uniform European retail
banking market. Technically speaking, a coefficient on the error correction term has
been estimated. The coefficient is typically between 0 and minus 1, and a value e.g. of -
0.2 means that 20% of a deviation from the long-run relationship has been corrected inKLEIMEIER & SANDER
24
every time period (here every month), while a value of -0.5 suggests that 50% of a
deviation from long-run equilibrium has been corrected every time period. Clearly, the
closer the coefficient is to -1, the faster is the adjustment process and the better
integrated are the markets.
Figure 6 illustrates the results for nominal interest rates and Figure 7 for real interest
rates. The figures are summarising the empirical testing for which the details are made
available in Table A3 in the Annex. Only for countries and sample or sub-sample
periods where bars are shown could a co-integration relationship be established. The
absence of a bar therefore indicates that we do not find any evidence of co-integration
of this country’s lending market with the corresponding eurozone lending market
(countries for which data are not available are clearly indicated with an N.A.). The
height of the bars then simply indicates how fast the national rates are returning to the
long-term equilibrium. It should be noted, however, that in some cases – despite the fact
that co-integration has been accepted in the test procedures – the error-correction
mechanism has not been found to be statistically significant at sufficiently high
confidence levels. In such cases striped bars are used. Do we then find evidence for a
uniform European retail banking market? The brief answers are “no” for mortgages,
“no” for consumer lending and “maybe” for corporate lending.
Let us now go into more detail:
§  As argued earlier, judgements about market integration based on interest rate
convergence can be misleading. For example, nominal European mortgage rates are
converging because they are by and large following developments in the money
market rate. But as shown in our results here, they do not (yet) exhibit a long-term
equilibrium relationship in most cases.
§  Regarding nominal mortgage lending rates, we find evidence in favour of co-
integration only for three countries, France, Germany and the Netherlands. Whereas
co-integration can be found for all periods in France, co-integration is only present
in Germany and the Netherlands for the pre-EMU period and – surprisingly – not for
the EMU phase.
§  While there is very little to almost no evidence of co-integration in mortgage
markets in nominal terms, there is somewhat more, but still very limited evidence
for co-integration for nominal consumer rates. For Finland, France, Germany,
Portugal and Spain, we find a statistically significant adjustment process towards a
long-term equilibrium relationship, but the speed of adjustment towards this
equilibrium is very low for all countries except Portugal and France in the EMU
period (see Figure 6, Panel B).
§  For the corporate sector the evidence is pointing to more cases where nominal co-
integration could be established in particular in the EMU phase, thus pointing to the
more important role of competition (direct vs. indirect finance, etc.) in this sector.
Specifically for Austria, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, we find
a significant speed of adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium relationship in
the EMU period. Moreover, the speed of adjustment is higher than for consumer
rates and ranges from -0.4 to -0.7 thus implying a time period of 2.5 to 1.5 months
(see Panel C of Figure 6).CONSUMER CREDIT RATES IN THE EUROZONE
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§  In real (inflation-corrected) terms there is some more evidence in favour of co-
integration in mortgage rates, despite the fact that real mortgage rates diverge more
than nominal ones because of the inflation differentials in the first two years of
EMU. Here – and in particular in the EMU-phase – co-integration can (now!) be
found for Austria, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain (see
Figure 7, Panel A). For real consumer lending rates, however, we find less evidence
of co-integration with respect to the number of countries, but in these four countries
the speed of adjustment is higher than for mortgage rates. The mortgage rate results
may reflect the fact that borrowers extensively compare prices nationally, that the
national markets are more competitive and that inflation expectations play an
important role in the long-term-oriented mortgage market. In consumer lending the
sketchier evidence for co-integration may point to a less competitive environment
often characterised by high switching costs.
§  The strongest results for co-integration in real borrowing costs can be found for
corporate rates. Austria and Spain show significant error correction mechanisms in
all periods; France and Portugal in both sub-periods, and the results for Belgium,
Germany and Italy indicate co-integration in the EMU period.
In sum, we find (almost) no evidence of a uniform banking market for mortgages. The
picture differs slightly if one turns from nominal to real lending rates. Here mortgage
rates appear to be more co-integrated, i.e. households’ real costs of mortgage borrowing
are more likely to follow similar structural trends in the eurozone. The evidence of co-
integration in consumer credits is also sketchy, again slightly more so for nominal than
for real rates. Our conclusion is therefore also a (maybe) “no”. But we do find quite
some evidence for more unified corporate lending in the EMU phase from nominal as
well as real rate analysis. A “maybe yes” might therefore be justified, in particular in the
EMU phase. Our “no, no, and maybe” conclusion is, however, subject to three
reservations. First, and as mentioned before, our sample size is for obvious reasons very
limited for the EMU period, thus reducing the validity of the conclusions. Second, as
the effects of the single currency unfold, the rather sketchy evidence of integration to
date may increase. Finally and most importantly, equating evidence in favour of co-
integration with integrated markets can be misleading. Co-integration in banking may
not be brought about by cross-border lending, mergers and acquisitions or international
arbitrage. Rather, the statistical evidence of co-integration under the condition of a
single monetary policy may simply reflect a smooth and homogeneous pass-through of
monetary policy rate changes onto lending rates in all EMU members. The latter
phenomenon is investigated in the following chapter.KLEIMEIER & SANDER
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Figure 6. Speed of adjustment in co-integration of nominal national interest rates versus EU average
Panel A. Error correction terms for nominal mortgage rates
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Figure 7. Speed of adjustment in co-integration of real national interest rates versus EU average
Panel A. Error correction terms for real mortgage rates
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
A
u
s
t
r
i
a
B
e
l
g
i
u
m
F
i
n
l
a
n
d
F
r
a
n
c
e
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
I
r
e
l
a
n
d
I
t
a
l
y
N
e
t
h
e
r
l
a
n
d
s
P
o
r
t
u
g
a
l
S
p
a
i
n
f
u
l
l
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
p
r
e
-
E
M
U
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
E
M
U
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
P
a
n
e
l
 
B
.
 
E
r
r
o
r
 
c
o
r
r
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
t
e
r
m
s
 
f
o
r
 
r
e
a
l
 
c
o
n
s
u
m
e
r
 
r
a
t
e
s
-
1
.
2
-
0
.
8
-
0
.
4
0
.
0
0
.
4
A
u
s
t
r
i
a
B
e
l
g
i
u
m
F
i
n
l
a
n
d
F
r
a
n
c
e
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
I
r
e
l
a
n
d
I
t
a
l
y
N
e
t
h
e
r
l
a
n
d
s
P
o
r
t
u
g
a
l
S
p
a
i
n
f
u
l
l
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
p
r
e
-
E
M
U
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
E
M
U
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
P
a
n
e
l
 
C
.
 
E
r
r
o
r
 
c
o
r
r
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
t
e
r
m
s
 
f
o
r
 
r
e
a
l
 
c
o
r
p
o
r
a
t
e
 
r
a
t
e
s
-
1
.
2
-
0
.
8
-
0
.
4
0
.
0
0
.
4
A
u
s
t
r
i
a
B
e
l
g
i
u
m
F
i
n
l
a
n
d
F
r
a
n
c
e
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
I
r
e
l
a
n
d
I
t
a
l
y
N
e
t
h
e
r
l
a
n
d
s
P
o
r
t
u
g
a
l
S
p
a
i
n
f
u
l
l
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
p
r
e
-
E
M
U
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
E
M
U
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
Note: Striped bars indicate that ECT is not significantly different from zero. N.A. = not available.
N.A.
N.A. N.A. N.A.28
C HAPTER IV
PASS-THROUGH OF INTEREST RATE CHANGES TO LENDING RATES:
A STILL ASYMMETRIC EUROZONE BANKING SECTOR?
vidence of co-integration in lending markets can be produced by three
mechanisms: arbitrage, (threat of) international competition and a uniform
monetary policy impact on lending rates. Based on the few cases in which we
found co-integration, one cannot directly identify arbitrage and competition as the
driving mechanisms. In this case, retail interest rates could in principle follow the same
time pattern if banks in the different eurozone countries would pass changes in policy-
related interest rates smoothly and with the same speed onto lending rates. On the other
hand, the cases in which we did not find co-integration indicate not only a lack of
arbitrage and international competition but also an ineffective and/or heterogeneous
monetary policy impact on lending rates. An ineffective pass-through of interest rates
could be interpreted as pointing to a high degree of imperfect competition in retail
banking ( Cottarelli and  Kourelis, 1994). A heterogeneous pass-through could be
interpreted as limited institutional convergence in eurozone banking ( Kleimeier and
Sander, 2000). Thus, the investigation of the limitations and differences in the pass-
through of interest rates in the eurozone can provide indirect evidence about forces
driving or limiting the emergence of a unified eurozone retail banking market.
Following Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994), a growing literature discusses the response of
lending rates to monetary-policy impulses as an important part of the monetary
transmission process. These approaches typically model the transmission process in a
dynamic model for the lending rate such as
t t M t L t M L L ) ( e b b b + + + = -1 1 3
where L t and Mt are the national lending and money market rates, respectively. The
estimated coefficient  ßM is the impact multiplier. A value of less than 1 indicates
sluggish adjustment of lending rates to money market rates, also known as lending-rate
stickiness.
10 This leads to a partial adjustment process over time towards a long-run
equilibrium. In the long run, when the lending rate reaches its steady state value for any
given value of the money market rate, i.e. Lt-1 equals Lt, equation 3 takes the form of:
t t t u M L ) ( + + = q q0 4
Cottarelli and  Kouralis (1994) argue that this formulation is consistent with the
monopolistic competition model relating the lending rate to the money market rate. If q
is equal to one, we speak of a full pass-through in the long-run, while the parameter q0
then reflects the mark-up over costs in the pricing policies of the banks.
In investigating the pass-through in the eurozone, we estimate first a somewhat refined
version of the above-mentioned pass-through model, which is described in more detail
in Box 4. The impact and long-run multipliers are listed in Table A4 and visualised in
Figure 8.
                                                                
10 The study by Corvoisier and Gropp (2001) confirms that increases in concentration in the eurozone
banking sector can make the transmission of monetary policy to lending rates more sluggish.
ECONSUMER CREDIT RATES IN THE EUROZONE
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Figure 8. Multipliers for the standard pass-through model
Panel A. Mortgage lending rates
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Panel B. Consumer lending rates
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Panel C. Corporate lending rates
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Note: For each country, the left-hand side bars indicate the pre-EMU period, whereas the right-hand side
bars indicate the EMU period.KLEIMEIER & SANDER
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Among the most important results are:
§  The impact multipliers are in most cases far below 1, indicating a limited pass-
through of interest rate changes. Exceptions are in particular corporate lending rates
in Belgium and France and consumer rates in Belgium.
§  Even in the long-run, the pass-through is far from perfect. However, the long-run
pass-through works best in corporate lending rates and worst in consumer lending
rates. This result corresponds to our no-no-maybe finding in the co-integration
analysis and points to the fact that next to a lack of cross-border lending, a limited
interest rate pass-through is the second cause for the lack of integration.
§  For all three rates, it is also evident from Figure 8 that the pass-through mechanism
differs greatly across countries in both the short-run and the long-run, again
explaining the lack of integration in the presence of a single monetary policy.
§  Comparing the size of the multipliers over time shows evidence for an increase in
the impact multipliers in 6 out of 10 countries for mortgage rates, in 4 out of 7
countries for consumer rates and in 6 out of 9 countries for corporate rates. The
long-run multiplier increased for 5 out of 10 countries regarding mortgage rates, for
2 out of 7 countries regarding consumer rates, and for 7 out of 9 countries regarding
corporate rates. Again, this result is in line with our co-integration analysis where
we find slightly more evidence for integration in the EMU period.
In sum, the pass-through process is still far from perfect and exhibits strong
asymmetries across countries, thus going some way towards explaining the lack of
integration. However, there are some improvements in the pass-through process in the
EMU period, which are concentrated on corporate lending whereas the least
improvements can be observed in consumer lending. Overall, this stresses the
potentially important role of the introduction of the single currency, provided it is
supported by a regulatory and competitive framework that promotes a smooth pass-
through for creating a unified retail banking market.
The standard pass-through model has become a useful instrument for estimating the
effects of monetary policy on lending. Nonetheless it has a number of drawbacks in
particular for our problem:
§  The results for the standard pass-through model can be misleading in cases where
money market and lending rates are co-integrated. In such cases the standard pass-
through model should be extended by including a measure for the error correction
mechanism that brings lending rates back to their equilibrium relation with the
money market rate after a disturbance has occurred. This mechanism is typically not
covered in Cottarelli-Kourelis type of models.
§  The standard model views the pass-through mechanism as symmetric in nature,
regardless of whether interest rates move upward or downward, below or above a
long-run equilibrium or whether their adjustment speed is accelerating or
decelerating. Such asymmetries are, however, important features of a financial
system, influencing not only the pass-through of interest rates but also revealing
much about the heterogeneity of financial systems in the eurozone.
§  Banks may not always adjust lending rates immediately when monetary policy-
determined rate are being changed, but rather tend to smooth out smaller changes,CONSUMER CREDIT RATES IN THE EUROZONE
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either to reduce or avoid adjustment costs of changing prices (the so-called “menu
costs”) or because they are providing an implicit insurance for their customers
against interest-rate fluctuations with a view to maintaining a long-run customer
relationship. Such mechanisms have been investigated with so-called “threshold-
adjustment” models, which explicitly allow for adjustments only when a certain
threshold (a deviation from a long-run relation between the money market and
lending rate) is exceeded. Such models can do both: optimise the threshold and
estimate the (asymmetric) adjustment process itself.
We re-estimated the pass-through processes in the eurozone by making use of a number
of alternative pass-through model specifications that are being described in Box 4 in
detail. For detailed statistics on the various estimated models and the model selection,
the reader is referred to Table A5 in the Annex. On the basis of these analyses, we
selected the most suitable pass-through model for each combination of interest rate,
country and time period. These models are able to detect co-integration under
conditions of asymmetry and threshold behaviour – co-integration that would otherwise
remain undetected and could lead to a premature conclusion of limited competition in
the banking sector. The results of this exercise can be found in Table A6 in the Annex
and are visualised in Figures 9 and 10. Among the most important results we obtain are
the following:
§  The impact multipliers are once again in most cases far below 1. Likewise, even in
the long-run, we do not always find a full pass-through. Comparing across countries,
the asymmetry can also be found in this extended model. As in the standard model,
the pass-through is least efficient in consumer lending. Furthermore, the earlier
result of a smoother pass-through in the EMU phase is confirmed with again the
exception of the consumer lending market.
§  The extended model provides estimates of the adjustment process towards the long-
run equilibrium. Such an error correction mechanism indicates the speed of
adjustment. We find limited evidence for such a mechanism in the pre-EMU period,
but this evidence strengthens in the later EMU period. Again, consumer lending
shows the fewest significant adjustment mechanisms.
§  A second important novelty of our extended model is the analysis of the changing
nature of the adjustment process. The results show that there is no predominant
model that fits all lending markets and countries. Rather, we find that in some cases
lending rates are adjusting only when rates are sufficiently far from the equilibrium
– that is, surpassing a certain threshold. In other cases, adjustment is differing when
rates are moving upward or downward, or away or towards the equilibrium. In yet
another case, adjustment takes place only when there is a fast and large movement
away from equilibrium. For example looking to the EMU period, in corporate
lending we find in 7 out of 9 cases either a symmetric adjustment or no adjustment
process. Only in Portugal and Spain does an asymmetric threshold adjustment
model seem to be more adequate pointing to the fact that banks shield their
corporate customers from either small changes in interest rates (Portugal) or from
small but rapid changes in interest rates (Spain).KLEIMEIER & SANDER
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Figure 9. Coefficients for the optimally extended pass-through model in the pre-EMU period
Panel A. Mortgage lending rates
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Panel B. Consumer lending rates
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Panel C. Corporate lending rates
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Note: Only significant impact multipliers and ECT coefficients are shown. N.A. = not available.
N.A.
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Figure 10. Coefficients for the optimally extended pass-through model in the EMU period
Panel A. Mortgage lending rates
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Panel B. Consumer lending rates
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Panel C. Corporate lending rates
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Note: Only significant impact multipliers and ECT coefficients are shown. N.A. = not available
N.A.
N.A. N.A. N.A.KLEIMEIER & SANDER
34
Turning now to consumer lending rates we find no adjustment mechanism in
Germany, a symmetric one in Austria and Belgium and an asymmetric threshold
adjustment in Finland, Portugal and Spain. In these three latter countries, lending
rates are adjusted only after passing a certain threshold level, but even here the
evidence is in most cases statistically not different from zero. France is an
interesting exception as rapid movement of policy rates there are smoothed out.
11
§  Finally, also the extended models confirm the earlier result of heterogeneous pass-
through in the eurozone. The heterogeneity as measured by the standard deviation of
the long-term multipliers is the highest in consumer lending followed by mortgage
and corporate lending. However, whereas in the latter two categories we find some
evidence for a more homogeneous pass-through in the EMU phase, no
improvements could be detected in consumer lending.
In sum, the transmission process from money-market interest rates to lending rates in
the eurozone exhibits strong national characteristics, which are rooted in the specific
features of the national finance and banking systems. While there is some evidence for
the emergence of a smoother pass-through process in the recent EMU years, we are still
a far way from a uniform banking system. These results are in line with the findings of a
recent ECB study that suggests “that current ‘country asymmetries’ reflected in the
response of bank rates to monetary policy should decrease over time by virtue of the
implementation of the single monetary policy” (Mojon, 2000). In particular, the pass-
through is more limited in the area of consumer credit in comparison to lending to the
corporate sector. Overall, it appears that three factors are simultaneously important for
creating a uniform retail banking market in the eurozone. The first factor is the potential
impact of the single currency as suggested above. Secondly, further harmonisation of
national legislation in particular in the area of consumer credit where harmonisation
accomplished so far is limited (Diez  Guardia, 2000). Along similar lines, national
differences in taxation also go some way in explaining the lack of arbitrage, in
particular for mortgage lending. Thirdly, additional regulatory efforts and pro-
competition measures are needed to promote a smooth and more uniform pass-through
of monetary policy changes.
                                                                
11 Regarding the results for Austrian mortgage rates in the EMU period, Finnish mortgage rates in the pre-
EMU period, Dutch corporate rates in the EMU period and Portuguese corporate rates in the pre-EMU
period, the results for the BTAR* model are unexpected. The coefficients of some ECTs are out of the
expected range of -1 to 0. However, the optimal threshold in all these cases is close to zero. Thus,
whereas the model is optimal from an econometric perspective, from an economic perspective it is
difficult to interpret and might be misspecified. Therefore, in these cases we report in Figures 9 and 10,
the coefficients from the symmetric model (SYM).CONSUMER CREDIT RATES IN THE EUROZONE
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Box 4. Modelling the pass-through of monetary policy impulses onto lending rates
Beginning with Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994), a growing literature discusses the response of
lending rates to monetary policy impulses as an important part of the monetary transmission
process. These approaches typically model the transmission process in a dynamic model for the
lending rate, such as
t i t
* n
i
i , M t i t
* k
i
i , L t M M L L ) . ( e b b b b + + + + = -
=
-
= ￿ ￿
1
2
1
1 1 4
where Lt and M t are the national lending and money market rates, respectively (where we omit
the subscript “nat” because only national lending rates are part of the pass-through analysis and
a distinction between national and EU-wide lending rates is not required in this context). k* and
n* are defined as the model’s optimal lag-length which is determined by the minimum AIC
criteria for models with up to 4 lags.
1 Note that for k=1 and n=0, this model is equivalent to the
illustrative model that we introduced in the text. The estimated coefficient  2 ˆ â is the impact
multiplier. A value of less than 1 indicates sluggish adjustment of lending rates to money market
rates, also known as lending rate stickiness. The long-term multiplier can be calculated from
(4.1) as
￿
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In the long run equation (4.1) therefore has the form of
t t t u M L ) . ( + + = q q0 3 4
Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) argue that this formulation is consistent with the monopolistic
competition model relating the lending rate to the money-market rate. If q is equal to one, we
speak of a full pass-through in the long-run, whereas equation (4.1) models the partial
adjustment process over time towards the long-run equilibrium in the case of lending rate
stickiness, that is  2 ˆ â < 1.
It is widely accepted that the time series for interest rates typically exhibit an I(1) property, that
is, unit root tests cannot reject the null hypothesis of a random walk. Consequently, pass-
through models such as equation (4.1) are regularly estimated in first differences to avoid
spurious regression problems.
Next to the standard pass-through specification, we propose to base pass-through measurement
on a well specified error-correction model that explicitly incorporates the long-run relationship
between lending and money market rates provided the series are co-integrated.
t t ECT i t
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where ECT contains the estimated residuals û t-1 from the long-run equilibrium relationship
defined by equation (4.3), provided such a relationship can be established by co-integration
testing procedures corresponding to those described in Box 2.
This formulation has a number of advantages over the standard pass-through model of equation
(4.1). First, next to the impact multiplier estimate, the long-run multiplier can directly be
obtained from the co-integrating regression (4.3). The procedure is therefore computationallyKLEIMEIER & SANDER
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more efficient (Moazzami, 1999). Second, we can directly obtain the speed of adjustment
towards the long-run equilibrium via the estimated coefficient of the ECT in equation (4.4).
Third, this error-correction specification allows us to analyse a variety of adjustment
mechanisms – including the symmetric adjustment described in Box 2 but also alternative
asymmetric adjustment – thus showing more openly the differences in the financial part of the
monetary transmission mechanism. Moreover, using models with asymmetries allows us to
detect co-integration in cases where there are asymmetries and where the  Engle-Granger
methodology of Box 2 would thus fail to detect co-integration. Finally, only in cases where no
co-integration is present in the data is the standard pass-through model appropriate.
In particular, we are considering here five different specifications for asymmetric adjustment of
interest rates.
The first model we consider is the threshold autoregressive model (TAR
0) developed by Tong
(1983). The model makes a distinction depending upon whether the explained interest rate
(lending rate in our case) is above or below its equilibrium level. Thus, the TAR
0 allows for
asymmetric adjustment depending on the state of equilibrium-deviation. For example, if the
money-market rate decreases without an immediate adjustment in the lending rate, we obtain a
positive realisation of the error term ut. When in this case the autoregressive decay is faster than
in the case of money market rate increases, then the lending rate adjustment is faster downward
than upward. An appropriate test procedure is to set a Heaviside indicator It for different states
of ût-1.
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Using this definition, we test for co-integration by estimating equation (4.6), which represents a
modification of the ADF test. The null of no co-integration is rejected if the estimated F-statistic
for H0: r1 = r2=0 is insignificant based on critical values provided by Enders and Siklos (2000).
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with the optimal lag length m* determined via the minimum AIC criteria for models with up to
4 lags. When co-integration is established, an F-test for equality of r1 and r2 indicates the
presence of asymmetry.
The next model (TAR*) is a modification of the TAR
0 in the sense that the threshold that was
formerly implicitly set at zero is now allowed to deviate from that value. The rationale behind
such a non-zero threshold is that one or both variables may only adjust to a dis-equilibrium once
it exceeds a certain minimum deviation in one direction. For example, the lending rate will
adjust fast only when out of an equilibrium situation the money-market rate drops in a way that
the deviation from equilibrium exceeds an optimal threshold of, say, 0.5 percentage points. For
lower deviations or increases in the money market rate, adjustment takes place at a significantly
slower pace. Now the Heaviside indicator in conjunction with equation (4.6)
2 is defined as
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In accordance with Chan (1993), the optimal threshold a0* is found by searching over the mid-
80% of the distribution of ût and selecting the model for which the residual sum of squares is
minimised. Co-integration and asymmetry testing proceeds with the above described F-tests.CONSUMER CREDIT RATES IN THE EUROZONE
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The third variation is a Band-TAR model (B-TAR*), which defines the Heaviside indicator as
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while equation (4.6) has to be modified to
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Procedures for optimal lag length m* and optimal threshold a 0* are corresponding to those of
the TAR* and the F-tests for co-integration and asymmetry are applied to all three coefficient rj.
Such a model has often been applied in particular to model interest rate co-integration where
infrequent and discrete adjustments in the rates occur (Balke and  Fomby, 1997,  Baum and
Karasulu, 1998). For example, if deviations from equilibrium are small and will therefore not
lead to an adjustment of the dependent interest rate, one may find no co-integration within a
narrow band bordered by a0* and –a0*, while outside this band co-integration and thus an error
correction mechanism may be present. In the context of our study, such behaviour could be
related to the “menu-cost” argument of lending-rate stickiness such that banks only adjust
lending rates when deviations are sufficiently large. However, if it would happen that inside the
band co-integration is found but not outside, this could indicate that banks implicitly insure their
customers against excessive deviations from equilibrium by smoothing the response of the
lending rate.
In the TAR models the autoregressive decay always depends on the degree of deviation from
equilibrium. One could also make an image of situations where the adjustment speed depends
on how fast the rates move away from or towards equilibrium.  Enders and Granger (1998)
therefore propose a momentum threshold autoregressive model (M-TAR) where the  Heaviside
indicator depends as follows on the change in error-correction term, Dût
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Similar to the TAR
0 and TAR* specifications, the threshold in the M-TAR can either be set at
zero leading to the M-TAR
0 specification or be optimised at a 0* leading to the M-TAR*
specification. Co-integration and asymmetry testing proceeds based on equation (4.6) above.
The M-TAR models have successfully been applied to the term structure of interest rates by
Enders and Granger (1998) and Enders and Siklos (2000). According to the latter authors, M-
TAR adjustment can be especially useful when decision-makers (in our case banks) are viewed
as attempting to smooth out large changes in a series.
Based on the co-integration testing, we selected the appropriate model for analysing the pass-
through of interest rates. In the case where no co-integration was found, we use the standard
pass-through model (STD). This can be done by estimating the error correction model of
equation (4.4) with bECT set to zero. For this as well as for all other specifications of equation
(4.4), we have chosen an optimal lag length k* and n* for lending and money market rates,
respectively, by applying the minimum AIC criteria for all models with up to 4 lags in either
rate. Consequently, in the STD model the impact multiplier is given by the estimated coefficient
2 ˆ â  and the long-run multiplier q is calculated according to equation (4.2).KLEIMEIER & SANDER
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When co-integration was found, the long-run multiplier q is directly obtained from the co-
integrating regression (4.3), while again the impact multiplier is  2 ˆ â  obtained from the
appropriate specification of equation (4.4). The error-correction mechanism itself depends on
the optimal model. In the case of the symmetric co-integration model (SYM), the ECT is equal
to the estimated residuals of the co-integrating regression. bECT is therefore estimating the speed
of a symmetric adjustment process towards a long-run equilibrium. In the models with
asymmetric adjustment, bECT and the ECTs are 2-dimensional or, in the case of the B-TAR*, 3-
dimentional vectors which give the speed of adjustment depending on the definition of the ECTs
of equations (4.5), (4.7), (4.8), or (4.10), respectively. Furthermore, where appropriate, the value
of the optimal threshold a0* is reported.
_____________
Endnotes
1. Due to the small sample size of the EMU period, the models with the fewest lags whose error terms
fulfil the white-noise requirement – established via the Ljung-Box Q-test – are selected.
2. For both, the TAR* and the following B-TAR* model, the optimal lag length m* of the TAR
0
specification is used.39
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
ur study provides new evidence on the emergence of a unified European retail
banking market, with a particular emphasis on consumer credit. The first point
we stress is that the empirical artefact of converging nominal and real lending
rates cannot simply be read as a sign for an integrating retail banking market. Such rates
follow – often however with considerable delay – the changes in central bank-
determined interest rates, that is, convergence of lending rates could be the consequence
of convergence of monetary policy and not of market integration.  Secondly, we
therefore suggest basing our judgement on the existence of a uniform banking market
on a co-integration analysis. In doing so, we find very limited evidence for co-
integration in particular before 1 January 1999, that is, the introduction of the single
currency. The 2
nd BD and other regulation efforts in order to create a single lending
market appear to have been of a limited effect in this respect. Third, we find that the
relationship of national lending markets with the remaining eurozone lending markets
exhibits strong signs of structural changes that have come about with the introduction of
the single currency on 1 January 1999. This result should not be underestimated as it
indicates that eurozone credit markets are changing dramatically, although it is clearly
too early to provide definite evidence or to draw definite conclusions on integration
from this evidence.  Fourth, we provide, however, a first picture of the emerging
(uniform) eurozone banking market based on the limited database that is available so
far. In this exercise we found, fifth, that there are some tendencies for a more uniform
corporate lending market, while consumer lending markets are still more fragmented.
Sixth, we identify three driving forces towards a uniform banking market: Cross-border
borrowing and lending (arbitrage), a national and international retail banking
environment, and a smooth and uniform pass-through of interest rate changes onto
lending rates. Regarding the first point, lending is still a very much localised activity
and may eventually remain so. For an effective arbitrage process, a much higher level of
harmonisation is needed in particular in the field of consumer credit. If, however, cross-
border lending is limited, this lack of internationalisation of lending could have been
compensated for by a competitive behaviour of loan pricing. On the one hand, increased
competition would decrease lending spreads. Our descriptive analysis has delivered no
clear evidence in favour of the increased competition hypothesis and is in line with the
more sophisticated empirical work by Corvoisier and Gropp (2001). On the other hand,
more competition should lead to a smoother pass-through of monetary-policy changes
onto borrowers. Our study finds that also in this respect consumer credit lending is
lagging behind its corporate-lending cousin. Consequently, improving the competitive
environment in retail banking could not only significantly benefit the borrowers but also
help to unify the eurozone retail banking market.
Since a single retail banking market “does not simply relate to the free movement of
services and capital, but also involves the concept of consumers shopping around” (Diez
Guardia, 2000, p. 29), it is clear that integration is slow. In the debate over “whether
these problems are structural (to be addressed by competition policy or economic
regulation) or information-related” (Ibid.), our results point to the role of structural
factors in the presence of a still-infant arbitrage process. A tentative conclusion is that a
more unified European retail banking markets may require additional efforts in
OKLEIMEIER & SANDER
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harmonisation – in particular in the field of consumer credit as well as intensified
competition supported by adequate regulation and competition policies within countries
in order to speed up the pass-through process. Integrating financial markets is in itself
not a guarantee that a competitive market for consumer credit will be established in the
eurozone. Nonetheless, even our first and preliminary results also suggest that the
introduction of the single currency already has had and will most likely continue to have
an important impact on the emergence of a single eurozone retail banking market. The
direction these developments take needs to be closely monitored for all different
products in consumer credit in order to fully obtain the benefits promised earlier to
consumers with the single market initiative.CONSUMER CREDIT RATES IN THE EUROZONE
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TABULAR ANNEX
Table A1. Nominal and real cost of borrowing and interest rate spreads in EMU – Descriptive statistics
Country Mortgage lending rates Consumer lending rates Corporate lending rates
Full Pre-EMU EMU Full Pre-EMU EMU Full Pre-EMU EMU
Mean Stand.
dev.
Mean Stand.
dev.
Mean Stand.
dev.
Mean Stand.
dev.
Mean Stand.
dev.
Mean Stand.
dev.
Mean Stand.
dev.
Mean Stand.
dev.
Mean Stand.
dev.
Panel A. Nominal cost of borrowing
Austria 6.28 0.79 6.64 0.65 5.59 0.51 7.83 0.95 8.29 0.79 6.96 0.54 6.71 0.80 7.05 0.69 6.06 0.53
Belgium 6.02 0.82 6.07 0.85 5.92 0.79 7.82 1.46 8.16 1.65 7.20 0.66 4.60 0.66 4.58 0.51 4.62 0.89
Finland 5.95 1.11 6.36 1.07 5.19 0.72 7.15 1.17 7.58 1.16 6.34 0.69
France 7.47 1.18 8.07 1.01 6.36 0.44 9.66 1.28 10.31 1.12 8.44 0.22 5.99 1.51 6.56 1.50 4.91 0.75
Germany 6.03 0.74 6.17 0.70 5.75 0.76 11.06 0.86 11.47 0.80 10.30 0.24 7.95 0.47 7.95 0.39 7.96 0.62
Ireland 6.44 1.14 7.17 0.46 5.07 0.63 9.60 0.80 10.03 0.49 8.79 0.63
Italy 9.30 3.13 11.09 2.38 5.96 0.44 8.89 2.74 10.48 2.01 5.92 0.54
Netherlands 6.17 0.67 6.31 0.63 5.90 0.68 3.78 0.67 3.59 0.50 4.13 0.82
Portugal 8.37 2.83 9.88 2.32 5.52 0.71 12.40 3.33 14.05 3.01 9.31 0.46 6.39 2.14 10.22 2.49 5.56 0.58
Spain 7.23 2.32 8.27 2.23 5.29 0.63 10.30 2.64 11.54 2.45 7.97 0.58 7.01 1.22 7.35 2.03 4.60 0.76
Panel B. Real cost of borrowing
Austria 4.91 0.55 5.20 0.29 4.43 0.64 6.47 0.69 6.85 0.41 5.80 0.63 5.34 0.54 5.61 0.31 4.90 0.66
Belgium 4.42 0.87 4.68 0.89 4.01 0.80 6.24 1.58 6.77 1.67 5.29 0.73 2.99 0.69 3.20 0.74 2.72 0.69
Finland 4.51 1.54 5.25 1.36 3.18 0.80 5.71 1.59 6.47 1.41 4.33 0.75
France 6.14 0.88 6.63 0.61 5.16 0.34 8.33 1.03 8.88 0.73 7.25 0.54 4.64 1.11 5.13 1.06 3.78 0.55
Germany 4.78 0.53 4.96 0.51 4.49 0.52 9.82 0.89 10.25 0.63 9.04 0.77 6.69 0.40 6.73 0.38 6.70 0.67
Ireland 4.57 2.86 6.30 1.48 1.40 1.83 7.72 2.44 9.15 1.51 5.12 1.47
Italy 6.51 2.24 7.88 1.40 3.95 0.67 6.09 1.85 7.27 0.96 3.92 0.78
Netherlands 4.31 0.82 4.61 0.73 3.83 0.88 1.90 0.54 1.89 0.53 2.06 0.93
Portugal 5.62 2.53 7.94 2.10 3.20 0.86 9.68 3.03 11.11 2.76 6.99 0.83 5.87 2.56 7.28 2.14 3.24 0.80
Spain 4.41 1.72 5.42 1.16 2.60 0.88 7.49 2.05 8.70 1.37 5.28 0.85 3.57 1.54 4.50 0.96 1.91 0.88
Panel C. Spreads over money market rate
Austria 2.74 0.73 3.18 0.42 1.91 0.39 4.29 0.88 4.83 0.53 3.28 0.37 3.17 0.73 3.59 0.47 2.38 0.39
Belgium 2.37 0.54 2.43 0.58 2.24 0.44 4.17 1.14 4.52 1.26 3.52 0.35 0.95 0.15 0.94 0.13 0.95 0.18
Finland 2.12 0.56 2.45 0.39 1.51 0.20 3.32 0.63 3.66 0.48 2.67 0.23
France 3.55 1.02 4.01 0.93 2.68 0.46 5.74 1.09 6.26 0.89 4.76 0.68 2.06 1.07 2.51 1.07 1.23 0.25
Germany 2.46 0.57 2.67 0.49 2.07 0.53 7.49 0.86 7.96 0.53 6.23 0.67 4.38 0.27 4.44 0.22 4.28 0.32
Ireland 1.38 0.62 1.38 0.47 1.39 0.84 4.54 0.56 4.24 0.40 5.11 0.32
Italy 3.03 0.82 3.43 0.65 2.28 0.52 2.62 0.56 2.82 0.48 2.24 0.49
Netherlands 2.78 0.62 3.07 0.48 2.22 0.46 0.39 0.19 0.35 0.19 0.45 0.19
Portugal 2.89 1.01 3.45 0.78 1.85 0.35 6.93 1.60 7.62 1.47 5.64 0.87 3.13 1.18 3.79 0.86 1.89 0.51
Spain 1.71 0.39 1.76 0.42 1.61 0.31 4.78 0.68 5.04 0.64 4.29 0.46 0.87 0.28 0.84 0.28 0.92 0.29
Note: “Stand. dev.” indicates standard deviation. All rates are given in percentage points per annum. Blank cells indicate that the interest rate series is not available.44
Table A2. Unit root tests
Panel A. Nominal lending rates
Mortgage rates Consumer rates Corporate rates
Country Period t(level) F(level) t(diff) F(diff) t(level) F(level) t(diff) F(diff) t(level) F(level) t(diff) F(diff)
Austria Full -0.606 4.171 -3.219 5.223 -0.567 3.540 -4.253 9.046 0.155 6.384 -3.772 7.116
Pre-EMU -2.302 5.073 -3.387 5.750 -2.034 2.723 -4.216 8.898 -2.094 5.882 -3.657 6.723
EMU -4.388 11.739 -1.365 1.170 -4.234 12.752 -1.496 1.215 -2.669 6.104 -2.283 2.851
Belgium Full -1.667 5.885 -5.098 13.016 -2.203 5.395 -6.786 23.034 -2.686 7.015 -5.154 13.318
Pre-EMU -2.369 4.000 -4.184 8.762 -2.050 3.235 -5.603 15.714 -3.472 7.513 -4.466 9.995
EMU -1.934 1.875 -2.746 3.913 -2.541 3.321 -2.345 3.319 -2.615 3.532 -2.191 3.173
Finland Full -0.635 3.552 -4.152 8.620 -0.957 3.364 -6.740 22.721
Pre-EMU -1.569 1.702 -3.038 4.620 -1.843 1.997 -5.730 16.422
EMU -3.165 6.583 -2.781 4.339 -1.918 1.899 -1.172 2.788
France Full 0.611 2.156 -6.732 22.673 0.368 2.298 -7.197 25.919 -0.518 0.562 -5.761 16.595
Pre-EMU -4.606 11.670 -7.396 27.433 -2.704 3.951 -6.637 22.089 -5.805 17.901 -4.905 12.044
EMU -2.918 6.477 -4.107 8.444 -1.351 3.405 -4.927 12.172 -2.100 3.197 -3.993 8.008
Germany Full -2.319 4.070 -4.696 11.146 0.001 9.241 -6.606 21.906 0.236 13.546 -5.401 14.587
Pre-EMU -3.781 7.406 -4.203 8.882 -1.840 4.097 -6.060 18.413 -3.972 15.969 -6.184 19.136
EMU -1.316 1.389 -2.507 3.880 -1.601 6.632 -3.109 4.835 -1.693 4.161 -1.713 1.796
Ireland Full -1.431 1.542 -5.846 17.606 -1.353 1.596 -4.603 10.701
Pre-EMU -1.913 1.836 -5.067 13.268 -1.630 1.486 -3.780 7.155
EMU -1.228 2.723 -3.996 8.073 -2.302 7.016 -3.527 6.850
Italy Full -0.257 0.367 -5.082 13.251 -0.750 1.201 -3.231 6.228
Pre-EMU -2.389 10.881 -6.237 19.689 -3.887 9.707 -3.097 5.001
EMU -2.095 3.463 -3.218 6.572 -3.434 6.983 -1.638 3.128
Netherlands Full -2.214 5.260 -5.152 13.272 -0.991 5.740 -5.653 16.056
Pre-EMU -3.484 7.121 -4.610 10.678 -1.702 4.750 -3.571 6.460
EMU -2.596 3.379 -2.417 3.003 -1.899 3.755 -4.433 9.899
Portugal Full 1.248 3.681 -2.981 4.716 -1.844 1.851 -7.461 27.834 0.064 1.777 -9.412 44.383
Pre-EMU -1.549 3.338 -4.213 8.953 -3.918 8.006 -6.243 19.502 -4.319 9.453 -8.997 40.694
EMU -2.329 8.753 -1.710 1.872 -3.329 5.796 -7.129 25.597 -1.965 3.452 -3.705 7.633
Spain Full 0.242 4.107 -3.904 8.714 -0.514 0.775 -5.844 17.092 0.467 2.539 -5.349 14.385
Pre-EMU -1.709 1.474 -3.289 6.229 -3.215 6.092 -4.024 8.425 -1.736 1.545 -4.325 9.467
EMU -1.798 1.867 -1.315 2.351 -1.469 1.217 -5.657 18.438 -2.741 6.181 -3.740 7.30045
Table A2 cont., Unit root tests
Panel B. Real lending rates
Mortgage rates Consumer rates Corporate rates
Country Period t(level) F(level) t(diff) F(diff) t(level) F(level) t(diff) F(diff) t(level) F(level) t(diff) F(diff)
Austria Full -14.692 114.306 -6.668 22.231 -2.307 2.665 -7.457 27.821 -2.462 3.034 -8.421 35.457
Pre-EMU -18.732 186.695 -5.495 15.100 -2.422 3.150 -5.803 16.882 -2.541 3.562 -6.583 21.708
EMU -1.025 1.425 -5.691 16.288 -1.245 1.547 -5.272 13.936 -1.126 1.280 -5.442 14.885
Belgium Full -2.789 4.038 -5.714 16.337 -2.530 3.771 -5.806 16.895 -2.722 3.906 -6.357 20.219
Pre-EMU -2.066 2.662 -4.567 10.434 -1.714 2.495 -4.841 11.729 -2.402 3.580 -4.720 11.152
EMU -1.642 1.428 -3.476 6.090 -2.039 2.118 -3.274 5.364 -3.617 6.690 -4.821 11.624
Finland Full -1.894 1.954 -4.900 12.072 -2.055 2.270 -6.252 19.601
Pre-EMU -1.526 1.276 -3.736 7.037 -1.833 1.742 -5.078 12.911
EMU -1.652 2.869 -3.660 6.767 -1.438 2.004 -3.509 6.157
France Full -3.871 7.498 -7.600 28.879 -3.315 5.495 -6.970 24.296 -3.306 5.464 -6.849 23.460
Pre-EMU -2.913 4.293 -5.539 15.339 -2.693 3.690 -5.649 15.956 -4.321 9.418 -5.101 13.013
EMU -3.320 6.435 -6.848 23.544 -2.642 3.559 -3.731 7.196 -2.418 3.639 -6.203 19.303
Germany Full -3.347 5.715 -6.136 18.827 -2.174 2.385 -6.731 22.673 -2.727 3.801 -7.342 26.965
Pre-EMU -2.482 3.693 -4.913 12.074 -1.173 1.492 -5.262 13.924 -1.529 2.400 -6.075 18.509
EMU -1.965 2.068 -3.521 6.204 -2.505 3.228 -4.292 9.309 -1.922 2.192 -4.436 9.913
Ireland Full -1.688 1.999 -5.516 15.211 -1.742 2.041 -5.635 15.887
Pre-EMU -1.575 1.247 -4.787 11.535 -1.521 1.179 -4.881 12.058
EMU -3.237 8.494 -3.874 7.504 -5.397 19.201 -3.384 5.727
Italy Full -1.198 0.783 -5.372 14.516 -1.310 0.986 -4.343 9.561
Pre-EMU 0.094 2.239 -4.747 11.313 0.000 2.749 -4.332 9.383
EMU -1.006 1.654 -3.884 8.123 -1.107 8.092 -4.038 8.569
Netherlands Full -2.373 3.026 -6.175 19.085 -2.162 2.740 -6.595 21.751
Pre-EMU -3.477 6.171 -5.396 14.576 -1.908 2.160 -5.782 16.720
EMU -1.762 1.554 -2.964 4.407 -2.681 4.970 -3.274 5.406
Portugal Full -1.837 1.687 -4.769 11.374 -2.821 4.009 -7.050 24.852 -2.472 3.062 -7.152 25.615
Pre-EMU -1.778 3.383 -4.294 9.230 -3.156 5.668 -6.131 18.794 -3.140 5.946 -6.170 19.225
EMU -1.922 2.033 -4.192 8.841 -1.651 4.372 -7.830 30.797 -2.097 2.258 -4.019 8.146
Spain Full -3.298 5.491 -4.623 10.684 -3.992 8.241 -6.254 19.601 -2.877 4.282 -5.627 15.831
Pre-EMU -3.222 5.524 -3.855 7.436 -4.014 9.527 -4.870 12.431 -2.720 4.093 -4.445 9.888
EMU -2.898 6.963 -3.176 5.075 -1.568 1.884 -4.727 11.927 -3.100 7.279 -3.910 7.65846
Table A2 cont., Unit root tests
Panel C. Lending rate spreads
Mortgage rates Consumer rates Corporate rates
Country Period t(level) F(level) t(diff) F(diff) t(level) F(level) t(diff) F(diff) t(level) F(level) t(diff) F(diff)
Austria Full -3.251 5.413 -6.233 19.432 -3.834 7.365 -5.838 17.063 -3.480 6.095 -5.490 15.103
Pre-EMU -2.479 3.094 -4.286 9.193 -3.127 4.914 -4.225 8.924 -2.695 3.664 -4.142 8.584
EMU -3.462 6.058 -4.431 10.050 -3.112 4.941 -4.068 8.632 -2.753 3.837 -3.343 5.816
Belgium Full -2.168 2.608 -7.827 31.057 -2.083 2.263 -7.229 26.172 -2.837 5.165 -9.978 51.292
Pre-EMU -3.615 7.501 -7.541 28.987 -2.376 2.869 -5.880 17.330 -2.013 3.835 -11.149 64.436
EMU -1.296 1.823 -2.786 4.054 -1.215 2.239 -4.032 8.137 -1.376 1.852 -3.881 7.634
Finland Full -2.824 4.213 -7.233 26.161 -3.265 5.519 -9.384 44.052
Pre-EMU -1.780 2.683 -5.033 12.692 -2.136 2.858 -7.981 31.874
EMU -3.580 6.423 -5.107 13.071 -3.359 6.765 -4.981 12.716
France Full -3.464 10.135 -8.577 38.118 -3.461 8.834 -7.902 32.226 -3.951 11.286 -9.736 48.279
Pre-EMU -2.258 7.006 -7.468 29.581 -2.383 5.905 -6.852 24.709 -3.205 14.229 -9.734 48.718
EMU -2.404 3.050 -3.974 8.281 -2.808 4.231 -3.208 5.458 -2.896 4.264 -4.302 9.378
Germany Full -2.717 3.705 -5.642 15.917 -2.356 3.115 -6.437 20.974 -2.478 3.088 -6.559 21.630
Pre-EMU -2.092 2.221 -4.626 10.759 -2.255 2.620 -5.094 13.426 -1.623 1.329 -5.030 13.003
EMU -1.320 1.717 -3.940 7.764 -2.196 2.411 -3.479 6.858 -2.316 2.692 -3.749 7.420
Ireland Full -2.057 2.175 -5.624 15.830 -1.716 1.481 -7.144 25.589
Pre-EMU -0.066 0.794 -4.867 11.865 -0.450 0.668 -5.729 16.445
EMU -1.549 1.729 -3.692 7.134 -2.220 2.483 -4.507 10.665
Italy Full -2.759 5.275 -10.546 55.969 -3.684 9.662 -10.317 53.869
Pre-EMU -2.037 3.120 -9.096 41.673 -3.380 6.897 -8.887 40.356
EMU -4.471 10.133 -4.331 9.522 -1.255 2.143 -4.851 12.402
Netherlands Full -2.511 3.382 -5.742 16.500 -3.640 6.833 -8.508 36.204
Pre-EMU -2.206 2.584 -4.168 8.836 -2.525 3.207 -5.988 17.938
EMU -1.220 0.889 -3.645 6.973 -2.414 3.748 -5.980 18.396
Portugal Full -2.734 4.099 -8.429 35.787 -3.971 8.143 -8.048 32.412 -5.686 16.232 -12.529 79.107
Pre-EMU -2.400 5.142 -7.753 30.560 -3.876 7.891 -6.421 20.629 -4.774 11.475 -10.641 57.379
EMU -1.133 1.355 -4.331 9.986 -3.040 6.292 -6.654 22.146 -2.970 4.546 -4.807 11.557
Spain Full -3.100 5.017 -7.070 24.996 -3.146 4.980 -8.021 32.358 -3.255 5.341 -8.213 33.730
Pre-EMU -2.159 3.392 -5.244 13.846 -2.630 3.465 -5.990 18.419 -0.701 1.953 -6.534 21.422
EMU -2.949 4.638 -5.215 14.655 -3.885 7.946 -4.976 12.612 -3.418 5.995 -5.072 13.045
Note: t(level) and F(level) give unit-root test-statistics for the level regression of equation (2.1) whereas t(diff) and F(diff) give the unit-root test-statistics for the regression in first differences of
equation (2.2). The critical values for 100 observations are as follows: -3.46 (1%), -2.88 (5%), -2.57 (10%) for the t test and -8.73 (1%), 6.49 (5%), 5.47 (10%) for the F test. Blank cells
indicate that the interest rate series is not available.47
 Table A3. Co-integration of lending rates
Panel A. Mortgage lending rates
Country Period Nominal lending rates Real lending rates
Cointegrating vector
(t-statistics)
DW DF ADF
(k)
ECM Cointegrating vector
(t-statistics)
DW DF ADF(k) ECM
ECT
(t-stat.)
AIC No. of
lags
ECT
(t-stat.)
AIC No. of
lags
Austria Full LAUS  = 2.55 + 0.52 LEU
(14.77)       (21.93)
0.123 -1.724 -2.455
(2)
LAUS  = 2.96 + 0.37 LEU
(11.74)       (7.97)
0.427 -2.798 -2.120
(1)
-0.224
(-2.772)
104.61 1
Pre-EMU LAUS  = 2.90 + 0.48 LEU
(10.99)       (14.32)
0.127 -2.210 -2.481
(2)
LAUS  = 4.73 + 0.08 LEU
(11.98)        (1.19)
0.748 -3.249 -0.416
(-3.286)
41.61 1
EMU LAUS  = 0.54 + 0.86 LEU
(1.15)         (10.69)
0.213 -1.693 -1.723
(3)
LAUS  = -1.09 + 1.33 LEU
(-0.58)         (2.92)
0.393 -1.618 -3.494
(2,3)
-0.355
(-2.792)
5.43 4
Belgium Full LBEL  = 3.22 + 0.39 LEU
(8.48)          (7.50)
0.082 -1.431 LBEL  = 1.77 + 0.50 LEU
(4.01)         (6.11)
0.194 -2.372 -3.021
(1)
Pre-EMU LBEL  = 1.42 + 0.58 LEU
(3.42)         (11.34)
0.190 -2.599 LBEL  = 0.59 + 0.69 LEU
(0.56)          (3.89)
0.171 -1.872
EMU LBEL  = -2.17 + 1.38 LEU
(-3.47)        (13.01)
0.285 -1.700 LBEL  = -0.72 + 1.13 LEU
(-0.32)         (2.06)
0.282 -1.314
Finland Full LFIN  = 0.82 + 0.72 LEU
(2.76)        (17.58)
0.066 -0.957 -2.431
(4)
LFIN  = -2.47 + 1.31 LEU
(-5.10)      (14.68)
0.193 -1.868 -2.238
(3)
Pre-EMU LFIN  = 0.27 + 0.78 LEU
(0.56)        (12.67)
0.050 -1.097 -2.680
(2,3)
LFIN  = -4.45 + 1.64 LEU
(-3.70)         (8.11)
0.218 -1.403
EMU LFIN  = -2.20 + 1.26 LEU
(-4.40)       (14.81)
0.501 -1.826 LFIN  = -3.01 + 1.48 LEU
(-1.88)         (3.78)
0.458 -2.266 -0.350
(-2.226)
9.51 0
France Full LFRA  = 1.50 + 0.84 LEU
(15.73)      (64.08)
0.768 -4.022 -5.536
(1,3)
-0.468
(-4.865)
-23.18 3 LFRA  = 1.92 + 0.79 LEU
(9.41)        (20.93)
0.384 -3.005 -3.709
(3)
-0.264
(-2.769)
97.49 0
Pre-EMU LFRA  = 1.68 + 0.82 LEU
(12.26)      (47.04)
0.947 -3.509 -5.083
(1,3)
-0.337
(-3.002)
-34.91 1 LFRA  = 2.12 + 0.76 LEU
(4.25)          (9.11)
0.391 -2.379 -2.986
(3)
-0.379
(-2.895)
46.79 1
EMU LFRA  = 1.88 + 0.76 LEU
(5.32)         (12.72)
0.618 -2.149 -2.242
(3)
-0.959
(-4.939)
-32.22 3 LFRA  = -0.51 + 1.39 LEU
(-0.60)         (6.67)
0.494 -1.707 -0.017
(-0.067)
5.27 0
Germany Full LGER  = 3.59 + 0.32 LEU
(13.24)        (9.18)
0.094 -1.768 -2.081
(1)
LGER  = 3.40 + 0.25 LEU
(15.23)        (6.36)
0.329 -2.640 -2.937
(3)
-0.184
(-2.500)
99.57 0
Pre-EMU LGER  = 2.40 + 0.44 LEU
(10.10)      (16.06)
0.259 -3.286 -2.864
(1)
-0.197
(-2.909)
-20.73 3 LGER  = 2.93 + 0.32 LEU
(5.47)          (3.79)
0.217 -1.964
EMU LGER  = -1.33 + 1.20 LEU
(-1.10)        (5.90)
0.134 -1.843 LGER  = 3.55 + 0.22 LEU
(2.42)          (0.59)
0.647 -1.806 -2.636
(3)
-0.318
(-1.694)
19.40 0
Ireland Full LIRE  = 2.49 + 0.55 LEU
(4.73)         (7.63)
0.073 -1.126 -1.623
(1)
LIRE  = -5.92 + 1.98 LEU
(-4.51)         (8.14)
0.209 -1.922
Pre-EMU LIRE  = 6.26 + 0.12 LEU
(14.55)        (2.13)
0.186 -0.965 -2.264
(1)
LIRE  = 7.80 - 0.25 LEU
(3.86)        (-0.75)
0.354 -2.047 -2.327
(3)
EMU LIRE  = 3.54 + 0.26 LEU
(2.50)         (1.08)
0.214 -1.064 LIRE  = -13.18 + 3.50 LEU
(-2.00)        (2.19)
0.279 -1.355 -2.651
(3)
Italy Full LITA  = -8.72 + 2.72 LEU
(-8.02)       (16.77)
0.051 -0.823 -0.686
(3)
LITA  = -4.78 + 2.25 LEU
(-4.69)      (11.23)
0.116 -1.765 -2.235
(3)
Pre-EMU LITA  = -5.14 + 2.30 LEU
(-5.79)       (18.46)
0.143 -2.572 LITA  = 2.08 + 1.06 LEU
(1.19)          (3.34)
0.067 0.230 -0.494
(3)
EMU LITA  = 2.75 + 0.55 LEU
(4.49)          (5.26)
0.251 -1.891 -1.863
(3)
LITA  = 3.30 + 0.13 LEU
(1.99)         (0.33)
0.292 -2.18748
Table A3 cont., Co-integration of lending rates
Panel A. Mortgage lending rates
Country Period Nominal lending rates Real lending rates
Cointegrating vector
(t-statistics)
DW DF ADF
(k)
ECM Cointegrating vector
(t-statistics)
DW DF ADF(k) ECM
ECT
(t-stat.)
AIC No. of
lags
ECT
(t-stat.)
AIC No.
of
lags
Nether-
lands
Full LNET  = 3.60 + 0.35 LEU
(14.37) (10.44)
0.108 -1.855 -2.109
(1, 4)
LNET  = 1.31 + 0.55 LEU
(3.70) (8.56)
0.283 -2.339 -2.829
(3)
Pre-EMU LNET  = 2.84 + 0.43 LEU
(10.57) (13.06)
0.240 -3.376 -2.852
(1,4)
-0.198
(-2.759)
-8.14 0 LNET  = -1.37 + 0.98 LEU
(-2.83) (12.40)
0.591 -2.656 -0.216
(-1.392)
72.40 1
EMU LNET  = -1.08 + 1.19 LEU
(-1.91) (12.39)
0.210 -1.285 -1.844
(3)
LNET  = 8.88 -  1.25 LEU
(4.09) (-2.38)
0.424 -1.449 -2.223
(3)
-0.372
(-3.451)
7.56 2
Portugal Full LPOR  = -5.98 + 2.02 LEU
(-14.36) (35.08)
0.110 -1.644 LPOR  = -6.83 + 2.35 LEU
(-11.38) (21.12)
0.290 -2.223 -2.353
(3)
Pre-EMU LPOR  = -4.70 + 1.88 LEU
(-6.81) (27.02)
0.123 -1.542 -1.758
(1)
LPOR  = -10.95 + 3.03 LEU
(-8.36) (13.73)
0.337   -2.213 -2.299
(2)
-0.063
(-0.991)
81.87 3
EMU LPOR  = -0.84 + 1.08 LEU
(-0.90) (6.84)
0.171 -0.747 -0.564
(2)
LPOR  = 4.74 - 0.41 LEU
(3.24) (-1.17)
0.405 -1.595 -0.252
(-1.922)
0.71 0
Spain Full LSPA  = -5.09 + 1.73 LEU
(-13.43) (33.05)
0.111 -1.357 -2.082
(2)
LSPA  = -4.82 + 1.71 LEU
(-14.40) (27.99)
0.416 -3.026 -3.302
(3)
-0.140
(-2.500)
82.02 3
Pre-EMU LSPA  = -6.71 + 1.93 LEU
(11.59) (26.14)
0.138 -0.473 -1.349
(2)
LSPA  = -4.75 + 1.70 LEU
(-6.00) (12.89)
0.348 -2.319 -0.141
(-1.967)
47.36 2
EMU LSPA  = -0.76 + 1.02 LEU
(1.12) (8.90)
-0.686 LSPA  = -0.78 + 0.76 LEU
(-0.53) (2.17)
0.338 -3.911 -1.820
(3)
-0.359
(-4.007)
-19.26 149
Table A3 cont., Co-integration of lending rates
Panel B. Consumer lending rates
Country Period Nominal lending rates Real lending rates
Cointegrating vector
(t-statistics)
DW DF ADF
(k)
ECM Cointegrating vector
(t-statistics)
DW DF ADF
(k)
ECM
ECT
(t-stat.)
AIC No of
lags
ECT
(t-stat.)
AIC No of
lags
Austria Full LAUS  = 0.89 + 0.67 LEU
(3.13) (25.57)
0.157 -1.827 -1.804
(3)
LAUS  = 1.86 + 0.53 LEU
(5.95) (14.84)
0.601 -3.442 -0.241
(-2.617)
99.42 0
Pre-EMU LAUS  = 1.70 + 0.60 LEU
(4.79) (18.74)
0.231 -2.793 LAUS  = 3.82 + 0.32 LEU
(6.99) (5.57)
0.678 -3.115 -0.297
(-2.538)
44.31 0
EMU LAUS  = -9.31 + 1.79 LEU
(-13.92) (24.34)
1.126 -2.936 -0.195
(-0.935)
-41.99 3 LAUS  = -0.07 + 0.77 LEU
(-0.10) (8.09)
1.119 -2.835 -3.051
(3,4)
-0.613
(-2.597)
8.88 0
Belgium Full LBEL  = -1.23 + 0.88 LEU
(-1.48) (10.97)
0.230 -2.804 LBEL  = -3.40 + 1.10 LEU
(-3.54) (10.12)
0.263 -2.972
Pre-EMU LBEL  = -4.58 + 0.16 LEU
(-3.71) (10.41)
0.331 -2.547 LBEL  = -9.21 + 1.70 LEU
(-4.63) (8.07)
0.380 -2.575
EMU LBEL  = -9.24 + 1.80 LEU
(-3.42) (6.09)
0.274 -2.398 LBEL  = 0.40 + 0.63 LEU
(0.35) (4.25)
0.385 -1.511
Finland Full LFIN  = 1.14 + 0.81 LEU
(-2.54) (18.59)
0.463 -3.047 -0.161
(-1.924)
136.85 0 LFIN  = -9.68 + 1.74 LEU
(-12.55) (23.41)
0.582 -3.163 -0.197
(-2.132)
158.41 0
Pre-EMU LFIN  = -1.95 + 0.87 LEU
(-3.14) (15.42)
0.737 -3.325 -0.312
(-2.587)
80.89 0 LFIN  = -9.46 + 1.71 LEU
(-11.12) (18.79)
1.091 -4.005 -4.163
(1)
-0.531
(-2.647)
99.32 5
EMU LFIN  = -13.95 + 2.23 LEU
(-11.54) (16.80)
0.696 -2.361 0.225
(1.195)
-17.07 1 LFIN  = -0.98 + 0.69 LEU
(-1.07) (5.70)
0.587 -2.630 -0.511
(-2.751)
8.81 0
France Full LFRA  = -0.06 + 0.95 LEU
(-0.37) (55.52)
0.451 -3.149 -3.668
(3)
-0.368
(-4.237)
2.32 1 LFRA  = 0.69 + 0.88 LEU
(3.14) (34.86)
0.579 -3.542 -3.983
(3)
-0.309
(-2.150)
109.88 0
Pre-EMU LFRA  = 0.48 + 0.91 LEU
(1.76) (36.04)
0.549 -2.760 -3.243
(3)
-0.374
(-3.091)
7.19 0 LFRA  = 0.90 + 0.86 LEU
(1.87) (16.58)
0.576 -2.908 -3.289
(3)
-0.342
(-2.011)
63.60 0
EMU LFRA  = 2.16 + 0.70 LEU
(6.50) (18.87)
1.195 -3.010 -3.666
(2,3,4)
-0.757
(-3.469)
-57.97 1 LFRA  = -0.15 + 1.00 LEU
(-0.41) (19.99)
0.837 -3.173 -2.628
(2)
-0.751
(-1.065)
5.50 6
Germany Full LGER  = 6.19 + 0.51 LEU
(58.03) (46.41)
0.375 -3.733 -0.112
(-1.587)
-47.89 1 LGER  = 5.26 + 0.59 LEU
(17.86) (15.69)
0.295 -2.139
Pre-EMU LGER  = 6.16 + 0.51 LEU
(35.01) (30.38)
0.358 -3.204 -0.068
(-0.877)
-49.38 2 LGER  = 5.84 + 0. 52 LEU
(11.42) (8.68)
0.301 -1.447
EMU LGER  = 5.68 + 0.57 LEU
(11.27) (9.19)
0.416 -1.044 -0.317
(-2.684)
-63.21 2 LGER  = -0.26 + 1.47 LEU
(-0.328) (11.17)
0.709 -2.184 -0.563
(-2.418)
12.58 1
Portugal Full LPOR  = -12.98 + 2.51 LEU
(-12.53) (24.69)
0.638 -3.550 -2.637
(1)
-0.341
(-3.931)
250.60 0 LPOR  = -10.02 + 2.29 LEU
(-5.78) (11.46)
0.325 -2.432 -1.890
(1)
Pre-EMU LPOR  = -11.75 + 2.41 LEU
(-7.31) (16.15)
0.604 -2.898 -0.309
(-2.948)
150.42 0 LPOR  = -13.52 + 2.68 LEU
(-3.79) (6.93)
0.273 -1.430
EMU LPOR  = 6.35 + 0.33 LEU
(2.26) (1.06)
2.590 -6.471 -6.277
(3)
-1.479
(-6.848)
38.73 3 LPOR  = 6.49 + 0.05 LEU
(3.06) (0.19)
1.216 -2.999 -0.256
(-1.034)
53.23 2
Spain Full LSPA  = -13.27 + 2.32 LEU
(-21.39) (38.21)
0.373 -3.444 -3.134
(3)
-0.306
(-4.253)
133.17 1 LSPA  = -8.62 + 1.83 LEU
(-8.51) (16.00)
0.226 -2.435
Pre-EMU LSPA  = -13.26 + 2.32 LEU
(-12.54) (23.55)
0.292 -2.570 -2.253
(3)
LSPA  = -5.23 + 1.49 LEU
(-3.19) (8.52)
0.255 -1.538
EMU LSPA  = -10.20 + 1.98 LEU
(-5.35) (9.54)
0.730 -2.349 -0.329
(-1.645)
8.07 0 LSPA  = 1.23 + 0.50 LEU
(0.98) (3.12)
0.367 -3.540 -2.767
(1)
-0.334
(-3.055)
2.59 150
 Table A3 cont., Co-integration of lending rates
Panel C. Corporate lending rates
Country Period Nominal lending rates Real lending rates
Cointegrating vector
(t-statistics)
DW DF ADF(k) ECM Cointegrating vector
(t-statistics)
DW DF ADF(k) ECM
ECT
(t-stat.)
AIC No. of
lags
ECT
(t-stat.)
AIC No. of
lags
Austria Full LAUS  = 2.28 + 0.63 LEU
(18.80) (37.13)
0.184 -2.375 -2.281
(2)
LAUS  = 2.74 + 0.51 LEU
(10.56) (10.19)
0.634 -3.498 -1.866
(1,2)
-0.336
(-3.676)
100.20 0
Pre-EMU LAUS  = 2.43 + 0.61 LEU
(12.08) (23.28)
0.142 -2.320 LAUS  = 4.03 + 0.28 LEU
(8.49) (3.36)
0.894 -3.533 -3.163
(2)
-0.422
(-3.264)
41.58 0
EMU LAUS  = 1.33 + 0.79 LEU
(8.41) (30.20)
0.906 -3.280 -3.814
(2)
-0.669
(-2.639)
-33.46 2 LAUS  = -0.91 + 1.38 LEU
(-0.82) (5.14)
0.700 -2.059 -0.738
(-3.293)
6.06 2
Belgium Full LBEL  = 3.19 + 0.20 LEU
(7.47) (3.35)
0.088 -1.654 -2.057
(1,3)
LBEL  = 1.46 + 0.29 LEU
(2.96) (3.13)
0.209 -2.412 -1.910
(1,4)
Pre-EMU LBEL  = 3.18 + 0.18 LEU
(6.48) (2.88)
0.142 -3.568 -0.168
(-3.381)
2.82 0 LBEL  = 3.31 - 0.02 LEU
(2.60) (-0.09)
0.168 -2.156 -2.346
(1)
EMU LBEL  = -3.08 + 1.28 LEU
(-4.75) (11.95)
0.304 -1.559 LBEL  = 1.75 + 0.20 LEU
(1.73) (0.84)
0.963 -2.427 -0.531
(-3.086)
8.30 2
France Full LFRA  = -3.14 + 1.26 LEU
(-9.82) (28.84)
0.312 -2.430 LFRA  = -1.59 + 1.18 LEU
(-3.11) (12.28)
0.204 -2.960 -2.699
(3)
Pre-EMU LFRA  = -4.95 + 1.47 LEU
(-10.68) (25.02)
0.389 -2.079 -2.844
(3)
-0.212
(-0.268)
24.10 2 LFRA  = -9.69 + 2.56 LEU
(-7.92) (12.14)
0.574 -3.457 -0.186
(-1.991)
66.83 0
EMU LFRA  = -2.06 + 1.12 LEU
(-4.00) (13.56)
0.870 -2.602 -0.203
(-0.954)
10.38 0 LFRA  = 0.91 + 0.65 LEU
(1.44) (4.39)
1.467 -3.508 -0.667
(-2.192)
14.67 0
Germany Full LGER  = 6.84 + 0.17 LEU
(33.78) (5.61)
0.044 -1.576 -2.248
(2,3,4)
LGER  = 6.36 + 0.07 LEU
(31.75) (1.68)
0.386 -2.684 -0.204
(-2.738)
94.04 0
Pre-EMU LGER  = 6.17 + 0.24 LEU
(38.73) (11.30)
0.157 -2.890 -2.891
(1,3,4)
LGER  = 6.68 + 0. 01 LEU
(14.91) (0.12)
0.331 -1.705
EMU LGER  = 3.31 + 0.90 LEU
(15.43) (21.88)
0.565 -2.331 -0.156
(-1.367)
-51.61 1 LGER  = 3.16 + 1.08 LEU
(3.38) (3.69)
0.484 -1.640 -0.596
(-2.799)
17.16 3
Ireland Full LIRE  = 6.50 + 0.44 LEU
(15.53) (7.49)
0.100 -1.256 -1.697
(1)
LIRE  = -2.75 + 2.04 LEU
(-1.96) (7.56)
0.243 -2.045
Pre-EMU LIRE  = 9.32 + 0.09 LEU
(18.16) (1.40)
0.212 -0.693 -1.907
(1)
LIRE  = 11.75 - 0.46 LEU
(4.56) (-1.01)
0.333 -1.982 -2.251
(3)
EMU LIRE  = 3.10 + 0.96 LEU
(16.17) (29.81)
1.123 -3.113 -0.711
(-2.838)
-26.58 0 LIRE  = -1.39 + 1.51 LEU
(-0.42) (1.92)
0.174 -0.770 -2.232
(3,4)
Italy Full LITA  = -7.59 + 2.51 LEU
(-5.76) (12.62)
0.028 0.922 0.389
(2,3)
LITA  = -3.90 + 2.03 LEU
(-3.23) (8.34)
0.113 -1.510
Pre-EMU LITA  = -4.23 + 2.14 LEU
(-4.93) (17.29)
0.086 -1.812 -1.040
(3)
LITA  = 5.72 + 0.29LEU
(3.96) (1.07)
0.049 1.041 -0.063
(3)
EMU LITA  = 1.68 + 0.71 LEU
(3.92) (9.97)
0.233 -3.387 -0.453
(-4.944)
-33.38 0 LITA  = -2.29 + 1.43 LEU
(-2.02) (5.36)
1.067 -2.876 -0.607
(-3.006)
-11.35 4
Nether-
lands
Full LNET  = 3.65 + 0.02 LEU
(8.03) (0.27)
0.054 0.257 -1.371
(3,4)
LNET  = 1.58 + 0.06 LEU
(3.87) (0.80)
0.354 -2.428
Pre-EMU LNET  = 2.89 + 0.09 LEU
(5.77) (1.41)
0.060 -2.064 LNET  = -0.63 + 0.41 LEU
(-0.74) (2.95)
0.416 -2.036 -0.181
(-1.696)
73.03 0
EMU LNET  = -3.87 + 1.29 LEU
(-14.84) (30.83)
2.246 -5.370 -0.688
(-2.147)
-2.52 0 LNET  = 4.31 - 0.54 LEU
(2.58) (-1.44)
0.267 -0.958 -1.764
(4)51
Table A3 cont., Co-integration of lending rates
Panel C. Corporate lending rates
Country Period Nominal lending rates Real lending rates
Cointegrating vector
(t-statistics)
DW DF ADF(k) ECM Cointegrating vector
(t-statistics)
DW DF ADF(k) ECM
ECT
(t-stat.)
AIC No. of
lags
ECT
(t-stat.)
AIC No. of
lags
Portugal Full LPOR  = -8.52 + 2.46 LEU
(-13.47) (27.43)
0.263 -1.189 0.871
(1,2)
LPOR  = -9.88 + 3.07 LEU
(-10.90) (17.57)
0.364 -2.577 -3.095
(3)
-0.067
(-1.118)
206.10 0
Pre-EMU LPOR  = -7.33 + 2.34 LEU
(-16.14) (39.03)
1.401 -4.788 -0.717
(-5.032)
86.33 0 LPOR  = -15.82 + 4.12 LEU
(-8.22) (12.04)
0.504 -2.018 -2.396
(3)
-0.178
(-1.893)
126.06 1
EMU LPOR  = 0.84 + 0.79 LEU
(1.57) (8.88)
0.731 -3.120 -0.452
(-3.581)
-9.42 3 LPOR  = 4.98 - 0.45 LEU
(3.55) (-1.34)
0.715 -2.476 -0.416
(-2.612)
21.47 1
Spain Full LSPA  = -6.86 + 1.87 LEU
(-19.07) (37.29)
0.345 -2.187 LSPA  = -6.69 + 1.93 LEU
(-14.42) (22.323)
0.605 -4.032 -3.968
(3)
-0.217
(-2.7697)
140.80 1
Pre-EMU LSPA  = -8.02 + 2.03 LEU
(-16.63) (32.12)
0.354 -2.511 LSPA  = -5.28 + 1.69 LEU
(-4.76) (8.84)
0.406 -2.768 -0.241
(-3.064)
62.31 1
EMU LSPA  = -2.38 + 1.14 LEU
(5.47) (16.13)
2.103 -5.042 -0.979
(-3.622)
14.14 0 LSPA  = -2.56 + 0.97 LEU
(-2.65) (4.45)
2.117 -5.434 -0.960
(-3.757)
21.73 0
Note: For the cointegrating vector, L indicates lending rates and the subscripts indicate the country. EU indicates the average of all countries except the country under investigation. Furthermore, t-statistics
are given in parentheses and the following test statistics are reported: Durbin Watson (DW), Dickey Fuller (DF), Augmented Dickey Fuller with optimal lag length selected by AIC criteria based on all
models up to 4 lags (ADF(k4)) or 12 lags (ADF(k12)). The critical values at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level for 100 observations are as follows: 0.511, 0.386, and 0.322 for DW, 4.07, 3.37, and 3.03 for DF,
3.77, 3.17, and 2.84 for ADF(k).52
Table A4. Standard pass-through model
Country Full period Pre-EMU period EMU period
Impact
multiplier
(t-statistic)
Long-run
multiplier
Impact
multiplier
(t-statistic)
Long-run
multiplier
Impact
multiplier
(t-statistic)
Long-run
multiplier
Panel A. Mortgage rates
Austria 0.139
(2.411)
0.722 0.064
(0.752)
0.563 0.073
(0.933)
0.609
Belgium 0.322
(3.226)
0.571 0.240
(1.721)
0.712 0.263
(1.819)
0.148
Finland 0.295
(4.491)
0.770 0.330
(3.953)
0.684 0.260
(2.229)
0.697
France 0.158
(2.640)
0.294 0.011
(0.165)
0.014 0.493
(4.058)
0.640
Germany 0.358
(2.995)
0.312 0.325
(1.824)
0.405 0.478
(2.339)
-0.916
Ireland 0.229
(3.076)
0.567 0.252
(4.681)
0.520 0.263
(0.787)
0.962
Italy 0.295
(2.586)
0.682 0.257
(1.632)
0.783 0.410
(2.497)
0.400
Netherlands 0.132
(1.485)
0.430 0.071
(0.577)
0.092 0.068
(0.490)
0.138
Portugal 0.163
(2.037)
1.027 0.174
(1.500)
0.468 -0.152
(-1.521)
0.440
Spain 0.152
(3.984)
0.657 0.126
(2.882)
0.530 0.113
(1.565)
0.512
Panel B. Consumer rates
Austria 0.152
(1.961)
0.850 0.049
(0.415)
0.908 0.181
(2.229)
0.711
Belgium 0.790
(3.642)
1.014 0.980
(2.795)
1.321 0.251
(1.145)
-0.575
Finland 0.528
(2.740)
0.800 0.067
(0.197)
0.770 0.372
(2.650)
0.590
France -0.007
(-0.098)
0.192 -0.150
(-1.582)
-0.144 0.063
(0.813)
0.236
Germany 0.166
(2.703)
0.494 0.140
(1.376)
0.412 0.141
(2.592)
0.405
Portugal 0.331
(0.706)
0.262 -0.485
(-0.598)
-0.281 -0.121
(-0.221)
-0.051
Spain 0.690
(4.942)
0.646 0.663
(4.237)
0.887 0.371
(1.191)
0.287
Panel C. Corporate rates
Austria 0.245
(4.697)
0.736 0.129
(1.978)
0.513 0.349
(3.910)
0.779
Belgium 0.808
(8.220)
0.849 0.864
(7.494)
0.959 0.878
(5.673)
0.716
France 0.387
2.836)
0.957 0.273
(1.445)
0.876 1.001
(4.662)
0.904
Germany 0.099
(1.476)
0.631 0.167
(1.611)
0.373 0.086
(1.540)
0.669
Ireland 0.269
(5.077)
0.638 0.300
(4.778)
0.764 0.074
(0.666)
0.532
Italy 0.150
(4.230)
0.850 0.126
(2.760)
0.843 0.165
(2.052)
0.875
Netherlands 0.308
(3.939)
0.900 0.167
(1.548)
0.772 0.333
(2.544)
1.029
Portugal 0.416
(1.856)
0.950 0.127
(0.317)
0.279 0.271
(1.034)
0.766
Spain 0.521
(4.911)
0.842 0.592
(5.645)
0.663 0.192
(0.626)
0.79453
Table A5. Pass-through model selection
Panel A. Mortgage lending rates
Country Period AIC values at optimal lag length Cointegration based on best TAR Engle-Granger cointegration Selected
pass-
through
model
TAR
0 TAR* BTAR MTAR
0 MTAR* Coint. test:
H0: Sj ñj = 0
Asymmetry tests Cointe-
gration?
DW DF Cointegration?
H0: ñ1=ñ2 H0: ñ1=ñ3 H0: ñ2=ñ3
Austria Full -8.809 -10.693 -13.714 -6.684 -9.412 4.315 7.673 0.155 6.075 no 0.027 -1.603 no STD
Pre-EMU 18.091 14.324 11.666 19.284 15.406 4.183 9.324 3.000 4.966 no 0.195 -1.276 no STD
EMU -37.148 -37.493 -54.685 -36.784 -37.180 15.540 26.829 0.068 26.756 yes, asym. 0.688 -3.046 yes BTAR
Belgium Full 69.602 65.195 62.956 68.304 63.725 4.220 8.656 0.069 8.678 no 0.137 -1.677 no STD
Pre-EMU 38.830 36.056 33.647 38.097 32.660 3.429 5.579 no 0.156 -1.074 no STD
EMU -13.638 -14.157 -13.383 -14.794 -22.168 9.982 9.965 yes, asym. 0.175 -1.521 no MTAR*
Finland Full 25.784 23.949 21.261 25.040 19.461 3.121 5.734 no 0.065 -0.643 no STD
Pre-EMU -15.419 -15.880 -35.379 -14.563 -18.739 9.707 26.536 2.588 26.420 yes, asym. 0.098 -0.196 no BTAR
EMU -24.429 -26.982 -27.663 -23.533 -24.347 8.243 4.554 0.032 5.249 yes, asym. 1.645 -4.055 yes BTAR
France Full 46.003 45.348 44.490 46.194 29.784 8.983 17.461 yes, asym. 0.041 -0.433 yes MTAR*
Pre-EMU 15.998 15.389 14.995 16.838 4.885 6.184 12.064 yes, asym. 0.073 -0.254 no MTAR*
EMU -26.447 -26.763 -27.158 -26.087 -28.445 6.321 2.860 yes, asym. 1.111 -2.979 yes MTAR*
Germany Full 27.187 26.675 24.093 28.065 19.037 6.067 9.259 yes, asym. 0.087 -1.322 no MTAR*
Pre-EMU 4.736 3.519 3.372 5.604 -4.700 5.693 10.859 no 0.107 -0.335 no STD
EMU -13.282 -16.399 -17.221 -15.115 -16.691 4.353 3.763 0.047 3.108 no 0.166 -1.556 no STD
Ireland Full 97.561 95.199 93.048 97.244 89.462 6.620 8.875 yes, asym. 0.210 -1.946 no MTAR*
Pre-EMU 4.796 0.401 -7.876 5.574 -4.633 8.474 13.848 0.057 9.667 yes, asym. 0.321 -2.293 no BTAR
EMU 14.958 14.168 10.908 14.098 13.127 2.971 5.698 0.384 4.901 no 0.236 -1.341 no STD
Italy Full 114.715 114.143 108.481 115.318 112.580 3.063 7.911 0.891 7.397 no 0.220 -2.329 no STD
Pre-EMU 60.029 55.139 52.176 59.219 58.592 3.628 6.553 0.799 8.862 no 0.324 -2.706 (no) SYM
EMU -19.533 -20.647 -20.762 -20.072 -20.148 3.467 3.094 0.135 2.912 no 0.516 -2.623 yes SYM
Nether- Full 48.618 48.111 48.706 47.110 46.051 2.297 1.463 no 0.098 -2.138 no STD
lands Pre-EMU 31.289 30.688 30.772 29.516 24.529 3.716 5.580 no 0.196 -1.519 no STD
EMU -10.401 -11.807 -17.932 -11.363 -15.300 5.203 9.730 0.007 9.755 no 0.222 -1.387 no STD
Portugal Full 93.748 93.156 88.771 92.702 89.870 3.558 6.566 0.181 6.511 no 0.158 -1.843 no STD
Pre-EMU 29.632 27.846 27.266 29.520 24.414 5.031 4.743 no 0.166 -1.866 no STD
EMU -5.387 -6.051 -7.709 -5.496 -7.349 2.543 4.135 0.021 4.082 no 0.440 -1.784 yes SYM
Spain Full 83.431 81.636 80.325 83.275 79.410 5.768 3.899 no 0.485 -3.515 yes SYM
Pre-EMU 45.312 43.086 40.946 45.256 43.206 5.152 5.458 0.574 6.158 no 0.785 -3.209 yes SYM
EMU -21.138 -21.342 -23.877 -20.252 -21.167 3.206 4.420 0.014 4.458 no 0.649 -2.091 yes SYM54
Table A5 cont., Pass-through model selection
Panel B. Consumer lending rates
Country Period AIC values at optimal lag length Cointegration based on best TAR Engle-Granger cointegration Selected
pass-
through
TAR
0 TAR* BTAR MTAR
0 MTAR* Coint. test:
H0: Sj ñj = 0
Asymmetry tests Cointe-
gration?
DW DF Cointegration?
H0: ñ1=ñ2 H0: ñ1=ñ3 H0: ñ2=ñ3
model
Austria Full 25.013 23.382 22.656 28.219 25.687 3.904 6.906 0.082 4.899 no 0.030 -1.696 no STD
Pre-EMU 41.087 39.837 39.437 41.817 38.164 1.995 3.637 no 0.253 -1.435 no STD
EMU -36.152 -37.198 -35.885 -34.210 -37.113 5.744 1.197 no 0.644 -3.194 yes SYM
Belgium Full 143.262 143.087 144.219 142.597 101.126 36.024 66.933 yes, asym. 0.121 -1.511 no MTAR*
Pre-EMU 89.256 87.285 86.167 89.959 82.737 3.931 6.999 no 0.248 -1.629 no STD
EMU -15.187 -15.506 -18.248 -14.556 -19.277 4.965 4.928 no 0.405 -2.072 yes SYM
Finland Full 103.011 98.483 99.914 101.569 94.534 5.252 10.496 no 0.255 -1.810 no STD
Pre-EMU 59.790 54.981 55.216 58.911 49.056 6.008 12.008 yes, asym. 0.617 -2.438 yes MTAR*
EMU -25.893 -29.679 -30.067 -26.211 -27.164 6.815 4.921 0.253 6.634 yes, asym. 1.318 -3.377 yes BTAR
France Full 74.754 73.603 74.372 73.470 61.647 7.451 14.546 yes, asym. 0.048 -0.331 no MTAR*
Pre-EMU 40.386 39.082 38.453 42.472 31.068 5.775 11.461 no 0.110 -0.522 yes SYM
EMU -43.426 -44.449 -43.006 -47.796 -47.796 10.988 14.123 yes, asym. 0.713 -2.199 yes MTAR*
Germany Full -37.577 -37.823 -37.961 -31.338 -33.914 4.426 2.629 9.072 1.936 no 0.014 -1.621 no STD
Pre-EMU 6.206 3.030 1.929 3.259 1.225 2.737 4.935 no 0.095 -0.736 no STD
EMU -57.282 -62.758 -61.294 -56.414 -59.177 4.464 6.455 no 0.266 -1.252 no STD
Portugal Full 247.188 246.237 244.963 247.955 244.056 2.944 3.693 no 0.609 -3.198 yes SYM
Pre-EMU 139.137 137.954 136.794 139.043 138.572 3.047 3.697 0.001 3.774 no 0.966 -3.933 yes SYM
EMU 31.387 26.801 26.988 31.324 31.052 7.412 3.930 yes, asym. 2.663 -6.715 yes BTAR
Spain Full 122.670 120.611 118.764 123.777 120.999 3.121 6.495 1.459 3.531 no 0.428 -2.522 yes SYM
Pre-EMU 53.491 50.555 47.809 53.359 49.841 3.462 4.158 0.701 6.717 no 0.583 -2.722 yes SYM
EMU 4.309 3.708 -4.718 3.200 1.044 9.257 11.714 0.009 11.714 yes, asym. 0.756 -2.971 yes BTAR55
Table A5 cont., Pass-through model selection
Panel C. Corporate lending rates
Country Period AIC values at optimal lag length Cointegration based on best TAR Engle-Granger cointegration Selected
pass-
through
model
TAR
0 TAR* BTAR MTAR
0 MTAR* Coint. test:
H0: Sj ñj = 0
Asymmetry tests Cointe-
gration?
DW DF Cointe-
gration?
H0: ñ1=ñ2 H0: ñ1=ñ3 H0: ñ2=ñ3
Austria Full -23.950 -23.970 -28.576 -21.840 -22.188 4.847 9.675 0.019 6.325 no 0.022 -1.624 no STD
Pre-EMU 16.502 11.820 9.505 17.367 12.852 4.173 10.043 3.628 4.225 no 0.156 -1.017 no STD
EMU -38.548 -39.216 -38.351 -37.247 -38.589 3.207 0.619 no 0.508 -2.428 yes SYM
Belgium Full -9.587 -13.745 -14.346 -11.089 -15.119 7.398 5.804 yes, asym. 0.890 -4.332 yes MTAR*
Pre-EMU -31.691 -33.068 -33.352 -35.647 -36.521 4.024 5.435 no 1.255 -4.621 yes SYM
EMU -19.587 -21.177 -23.510 -18.641 -24.748 5.793 6.498 no 0.585 -2.088 yes SYM
France Full 78.407 76.427 72.602 78.186 68.940 5.721 9.256 no 0.063 -0.917 no STD
Pre-EMU 29.103 26.211 28.152 29.561 22.722 4.215 6.538 no 0.070 -0.434 no STD
EMU -3.920 -4.168 -3.866 -4.031 -5.339 6.583 1.103 yes, sym. 1.095 -2.865 yes SYM
Germany Full -19.812 -22.480 -28.378 -21.116 -23.075 6.341 10.944 0.138 10.927 yes, asym. 0.353 -2.646 yes BTAR
Pre-EMU -41.853 -42.221 -43.540 -40.799 -45.274 2.868 4.404 no 0.308 -2.004 no STD
EMU -21.516 -22.703 -23.647 -20.460 -20.804 2.368 3.949 1.163 2.731 no 0.594 -1.554 yes SYM
Ireland Full 37.106 35.440 29.508 36.851 35.068 6.141 7.974 0.180 8.911 yes, asym. 0.655 -3.435 yes BTAR
Pre-EMU 10.077 9.489 1.463 10.273 7.986 6.635 10.080 0.003 9.401 yes, asym. 0.649 -2.903 yes BTAR
EMU -13.993 -14.850 -15.010 -13.179 -14.219 2.779 2.960 1.124 1.970 no 0.824 -2.146 yes STD
Italy Full 75.888 75.075 73.185 72.100 69.719 3.653 6.027 no 0.178 -2.367 no STD
Pre-EMU 25.615 21.013 21.372 22.912 19.594 4.654 7.192 no 0.282 -2.814 no STD
EMU -24.174 -25.423 -25.129 -22.708 -24.854 3.769 1.575 no 0.222 -2.411 no STD
Netherlands Full 35.825 34.919 32.975 35.824 34.957 3.967 4.729 0.003 4.730 no 0.914 -4.397 yes SYM
Pre-EMU -1.091 -3.667 -4.690 0.071 -1.603 2.262 4.233 1.698 5.967 no 0.862 -2.657 yes SYM
EMU -7.952 -8.641 -27.354 -7.773 -8.191 18.463 30.717 1.624 30.698 yes, asym. 1.232 -3.114 yes BTAR
Portugal Full 149.647 145.955 145.683 151.526 147.715 3.203 6.247 3.603 4.438 no 0.458 -2.573 yes SYM
Pre-EMU 73.258 69.654 65.301 73.607 73.152 8.890 9.303 0.861 9.327 yes, asym. 1.556 -5.232 yes BTAR
EMU -3.280 -4.617 -10.747 -2.692 -10.285 7.602 9.572 3.661 7.022 yes, asym. 0.470 -2.599 yes BTAR
Spain Full 87.828 84.660 80.689 87.916 86.232 4.655 9.294 0.381 5.574 no 0.924 -4.717 yes SYM
Pre-EMU 33.687 31.000 30.419 34.317 29.487 2.444 4.424 no 0.800 -2.799 yes SYM
EMU -0.267 -1.071 0.582 -0.059 -2.442 6.040 1.748 yes, asym. 1.574 -3.781 yes MTAR*
Note: The critical values for the co-integration and asymmetry tests of the best TAR model are listed in Enders and Siklos (2000). The critical values vary depending on the type of TAR model, the sample
size, and the lag length of the model. As approximate benchmarks, one can consider test statistics of 6.0 or higher for the co-integration test and test statistics of 2.5 and higher to allow the rejection
of the null hypothesis. – The minimum AIC value of the optimal TAR model is represented in bold.56
           Table A6. Extended pass-through of money market rate innovations onto ending rates in Europe
Panel A. Mortgage lending rates
Country Period Model Impact
multiplier
b2
Long-run
multiplier
q
Error correction
speed of adjustment
Optimal
threshold
a0*
Lags
bECT,1 bECT,2 bECT, 3 k* n*
Austria Full STD
Pre-
EMU
STD
EMU BTAR 0.131
(2.212)
0.572
(19.055)
-0.535
(-1.702)
-14.995
(-2.366)
-0.213
(-1.565)
0.007 3 0
SYM 0.133
(2.909)
0.572
(19.055)
-0.436
(-5.508)
3 0
Belgium Full STD
Pre-
EMU
STD
EMU MTAR* 0.355
(1.881)
0.777
(7.953)
-0.091
(-0.934)
-0.116
(-0.601)
-0.234 1 0
Finland Full STD
Pre-
EMU
BTAR 0.304
(3.510)
1.032
(16.684)
-0.082
(-0.960)
-10.617
(-0.858)
0.057
(0.908)
0.009 1 1
SYM 0.315
(3.749)
1.032
(16.684)
0.023
(0.660)
1 2
EMU BTAR 0.479
(2.857)
0.809
(28.301)
-0.902
(-1.433)
1.090
(-1.413)
-0.130
(-0.355)
0.089 1 0
France Full MTAR* 0.138
(2.200)
0.627
(6.615)
0.002
(0.022)
-0.037
(-1.915)
0.282 3 0
Pre-
EMU
MTAR* -0.080
(-1.044)
0.544
(6.551)
0.104
(0.748)
-0.024
(-0.954)
0.246 4 0
EMU MTAR* 0.448
(3.127)
0.489
(16.533)
-0.724
(-2.426)
-0.726
(-1.161)
-0.103 1 1
Germany Full MTAR* 0.488
(3.959)
0.773
(7.264)
-0.050
(-1.551)
2.353
(0.412)
-0.365 2 4
Pre-
EMU
STD
EMU STD
Ireland Full MTAR* 0.156
(2.149)
0.781
(14.839)
-0.195
(3.543)
0.550
(1.204)
-0.858 2 1
Pre-
EMU
BTAR 0.205
(3.809)
0.492
(7.997)
-0.081
-0.781)
-0.228
(-1.796)
-0.251
(-1.555)
0.359 3 1
EMU STD
Italy Full STD
Pre-
EMU
SYM 0.262
(1.660)
1.046
(23.239)
-0.061
(-0.936)
3 2
EMU SYM 0.314
(2.047)
0.444
(9.069)
-0.383
(-2.643)
1 0
Nether- Full STD
lands Pre-
EMU
STD
EMU STD
Portugal Full STD
Pre-
EMU
STD
EMU SYM -0.100
(-0.856)
0.756
(11.277)
-0.302
(-3.561)
1 0
Spain Full SYM 0.150
(3.643)
1.079
(53.388)
-0.027
(-0.855)
2 2
P re-
EMU
SYM 0.144
(2.901)
1.139
(45.123)
-0.047
(-0.879)
1 2
EMU SYM 0.064
(1.179)
0.692
(17.209)
-0.304
(-4.499)
1 057
Table A6 cont., Extended pass-through of money market rate innovations onto lending rates in Europe
Panel B. Consumer lending rates
Country Period Model Impact
multiplier
b2
Long-run
multiplier
q
Error correction
speed of adjustment
Optimal
threshold
a0*
Lags
bECT,1 bECT,2 bECT, 3 k* n*
Austria Full STD
Pre-
EMU
STD
EMU SYM 0.236
(3.181)
0.598
(18.522)
-0.357
(-3.143)
1 0
Belgium full MTAR* 1.033
(3.711)
1.451
(7.142)
-0.006
(-0.050)
-0.170
(-3.032)
0.140 2 3
Pre-
EMU
STD
EMU SYM 0.509
(2.312)
0.709
(12.238)
-0.084
(-0.360)
1 0
Finland Full STD
Pre-
EMU
MTAR* 0.284
(0.762)
1.089
(14.599)
1.349
(1.852)
0.039
(0.358)
0.501 2 1
EMU BTAR 0.473
(3.133)
0.777
(26.943)
-0.634
(-1.180)
0.906
(1.053)
-0.175
(-0.502)
0.070 1 0
France Full MTAR* -0.077
(-1.121)
0.658
(6.302)
0.008
(0.110)
-0.076
(-3.691)
0.307 3 0
Pre-
EMU
SYM -0.153
(-1.563)
0.632
(7.204)
-0.044
(-1.353)
3 0
EMU MTAR* 0.056
(0.632)
0.224
(9.361)
-0.613
(-1.768)
-0.595
(-2.321)
-0.004 1 0
Germany Full STD
Pre-
EMU
STD
EMU STD
Portugal Full SYM 0.307
(0.629)
1.601
(24.035)
-0.269
(-2.865)
1 0
Pre-
EMU
SYM 0.251
(0.303)
1.692
(21.397)
-0.543
(-3.845)
1 0
EMU BTAR 0.383
(0.735)
1.602
(24.035)
-0.147
(-0.711)
-0.78
(-0.432)
-0.354
(-.207)
0.188 1 0
Spain Full SYM 0.682
(5.107)
1.217
(41.880)
-0.196
(-2.747)
1 0
Pre-
EMU
SYM 0.704
(4.371)
1.246
(36.998)
-0.264
(-2.766)
4 0
EMU BTAR 0.261
(0.886)
0.584
(8.302)
-0.400
(-1.053)
-1.167
(-0.254)
-0.838
(-1.911)
0.045 1 058
  Table A6 cont., Extended pass-through of money market rate innovations onto lending rates in Europe
Panel C. Corporate lending rates
Country period Model Impact
multiplier
b2
Long-run
multiplier
q
Error correction
speed of adjustment
Optimal
threshold
a0*
Lags
bECT,1 bECT,2 bECT, 3 k* n*
Austria Full STD
Pre-
EMU
STD
EMU SYM 0.332
(3.807)
0.583
(18.256)
-0.406
(-3.029)
1 0
Belgium Full MTAR* 0.924
(8.457)
0.971
(36.378)
-0.314
(-2.149)
0.133
(0.385)
-0.210 3 0
Pre-
EMU
SYM 0.196
(3.123)
0.934
(26.368)
-0.481
(-2.449)
1 4
EMU SYM 0.801
(3.781)
0.996
(22.754)
0.127
(0.393)
1 0
France Full STD
Pre-
EMU
STD
EMU SYM 0.657
(3.050)
0.828
(16.688)
-0.522
(-2.426)
1 0
Germany Full BTAR 0.104
(1.779)
0.688
(19.949)
-0.044
(-0.346)
7.254
(0.463)
-0.147
(-1.484)
0.005 4 1
Pre-
EMU
STD
EMU SYM 0.128
(2.050)
0.684
(6.898)
-0.249
(-2.975)
1 0
Ireland Full BTAR 0.242
(4.782)
0.602
(27.054)
-0.067
(-0.599)
0.029
(0.122)
-0.385
(-3.010)
0.162 3 1
Pre-
EMU
BTAR 0.274
(4.694)
0.582
(11.010)
0.017
(0.137)
-0.462
(-1.288)
-0.494
(-3.108)
0.165 3 1
EMU STD
Italy Full STD
Pre-
EMU
STD
EMU STD
Nether-
lands
Full SYM 0.368
(4.512)
0.988
(27.541)
-0.237
(-2.868)
4 1
Pre-
EMU
SYM 0.194
(1.847)
1.040
(16.124)
-0.212
(-1.983)
3 0
EMU BTAR 0.272
(1.241)
0.924
(21.381)
-1.786
(-1.847)
675.389
(1.723)
-0.047
(-0.135)
0.00001 1 0
SYM 0.339
(2.324)
0.924
(21.381)
-0.777
(-4.700)
1 0
Portugal Full SYM 0.479
(2.078)
1.498
(36.254)
-0.315
(-4.833)
2 0
Pre-
EMU
BTAR 0.344
(0.929)
1.442
(39.361)
-1.335
(-4.681)
136.245
(1.934)
-0.084
(-0.315)
0.006 2 0
SYM 0.158
(0.403)
1.442
(39.361)
-0.666
(-3.897)
2 0
EMU BTAR 0.338
(1.472)
0.556
(6.968)
-0.445
(-1.747)
0.178
(0.324)
-0.857
(-3.067)
0.185 1 0
Spain Full SYM 0.593
(5.517)
0.999
(61.051)
-0.361
(-3.802)
3 0
Pre-
EMU
SYM 0.620
(5.792)
1.036
(48.390)
-0.147
(-1.078)
1 159
EMU MTAR* 0.565
(2.002)
0.825
(13.586)
-1.040
(-.319)
-0.933
(-2.141)
-0.027 1 0
Note: t-statistics are given in parentheses. Results for the standard model (STD) are reported in Table A4.